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Article 
Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When 
Judges Nullify Employer Liability in 
Arbitrations 
Michael H. LeRoy† 
Identify the moral dilemma in the following scenario: res-
ponding to rising litigation costs1 and soaring liability from 
employment lawsuits,2 a large company compels its employees 
 
†  Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations, and College of 
Law, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Copyright © 2008 by 
Michael H. LeRoy. 
 1. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957–61 (2000) (providing 
detailed empirical estimates of litigation costs). The minimum cost to litigate a 
business claim is estimated at $100,000. Id. at 957. A typical bill to evaluate a 
case and file a complaint is $6,000 if the stakes are under $150,000 and 
$12,000 if they are over $2 million; the cost of an action for summary judg-
ment is $18,000 or more. Id. at 958–59. 
 2. See Kathy Bergen & Carol Kleiman, Mitsubishi Will Pay $34 Million, 
CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1998, at 1 (reporting that the car maker agreed to pay $34 
million to settle a class action lawsuit claiming sexual harassment); Katherine 
Bishop, California Women Receiving Millions To Settle Sex Bias Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1988, at A1 (reporting that State Farm Insurance Company 
agreed to pay female employees up to $300 million to settle a sex-
discrimination lawsuit); Caren Chesler, Wall Street’s Catch-22: Its Managers 
Keep Tripping over Their Own Feet in Female/Minority Hiring and Firing, 
INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Sept. 19, 2005, at 24, 27 (reporting that Morgan 
Stanley settled an EEOC sex-discrimination lawsuit for $54 million in July 
2004); Jim Fitzgerald, Anti-Bias Efforts, Payments to Blacks OK’d, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Texaco agreed to spend $176.1 mil-
lion to settle a race-discrimination suit); Mary B. Rogers & Kimberly A. 
O’Sullivan, Image Discrimination: Is That Advertising Campaign Really Worth 
It?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2006, at 23, available at http://www 
.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/November/23.pdf (reporting that Abercrombie 
& Fitch paid $50 million in 2005 to settle a race-discrimination lawsuit, which 
alleged that Hispanic, African American, and Asian employees were assigned 
backroom duties during regular sales hours because they did not physically 
match the company’s advertising models); Henry Unger, 17 Coke Class-Action 
Parties Planning Individual Suits, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 7, 2001, at F3 
(reporting that a judge approved Coca-Cola’s $192.5 million settlement of a 
class action employment-discrimination lawsuit). 
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to sign an agreement that waives their right to sue. The con-
tract refers all disputes to binding arbitration, where both par-
ties must pay equal forum fees.3 A clause in the agreement pro-
vides, however, for de novo court review of an arbitration 
award—a ruling by the arbitrator.4 
Eventually, an employee sues the company over a 
workplace dispute. The court dismisses her lawsuit and orders 
arbitration of her legal claims.5 The judge cites the Supreme 
Court’s strong precedents favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.6 The arbitration agreement drafted by the em-
ployer names the provider of arbitration services and sets pro-
cedural rules for the private adjudication.7 
After a hearing occurs, the arbitrator renders a ruling for 
the employee. The award rules that the employer breached a 
legal duty and orders large damages.8 Appealing the award to 
court, the employer invokes the expanded review clause in the 
arbitration agreement. The court vacates the award,9 leaving 
 
 3. E.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1232 
(10th Cir. 1999) (noting that a janitor reluctantly signed an arbitration 
agreement that made him pay half of the arbitrator’s fees and that he later 
learned that to pursue his race and age discrimination claims, he had to make 
a deposit of $6,000 to initiate the proceedings).  
 4. See, e.g., Hughes v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
an arbitration agreement, which effectively provided that “[e]ither party may 
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . to vacate an arbitra-
tion award. However, in [these] actions . . . the standard of review to be ap-
plied to the arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law will be the same 
as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sit-
ting without a jury.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Smith v. PSI Serv. II, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-6749, 2001 WL 
41122, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2001). 
 6. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that by enacting the 
FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration”).   
 7. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935–36 (4th Cir. 
1999) (finding that the arbitration agreement had been drafted by the employ-
er and making reference to other rules also drafted by the employer). 
 8. See, e.g., Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35, 36 
(6th Cir. 1996) (stating that an arbitrator found that an employer violated 
state and federal discrimination laws and awarded back pay, attorney fees, 
and reinstatement to a comparable position). 
 9. See, e.g., Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 498 (5th 
Cir. 2004). A school principal who sued her employer, alleging sexual harass-
ment under Title VII and whistleblower violations, was ordered by the court to 
arbitrate her claim. Id. at 493. After she prevailed at arbitration and was 
awarded $157,856.52, the school district went to federal court to vacate the 
award. Id. at 494. The lower court denied the motion, but was reversed by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 494–98. Judge Edith Jones ruled that 
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the employee without access to a court and stuck with a useless 
award that cost her thousands of dollars. 
What is the moral dilemma here? The following are poten-
tial answers to this quandary: 
1. The employer compelled its employee to forego access to 
the courts, depriving her access to a jury trial.10 
2. In substituting arbitration for a court, the employer took 
advantage of its economic superiority by shifting forum costs to 
the individual worker.11 
3. There is no moral dilemma. The parties had a contract. 
Although the employer drafted the agreement and took advan-
tage of its superior bargaining power over the individual, this 
arrangement was not so unfair as to void the contract under 
the doctrine of adhesion.12 The employee received her end of the 
bargain—and notably, she won. 
4. The employer failed to take responsibility for the conse-
quences of its own promise to substitute arbitration for a court. 
By inserting a clause for expanded judicial review of the arbi-
 
“the parties intended judicial review to be available beyond the normal narrow 
range of the FAA or MUAA.” Id. at 498. In vacating the district court’s order 
confirming the arbitration award, she wryly noted, “[s]o much for saving mon-
ey and relationships through alternative dispute resolution. Perfect justice is 
not always found in this world.” Id. at 493. 
 10. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684 
(1996) (“Large companies will also attempt to select a decision maker likely to 
decrease their likely payout. One of the company’s chief goals in selecting arbi-
tration over litigation is generally to avoid a jury trial.”). 
 11. Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators’ Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Man-
datory Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 1, 4–5 (2003) (“If the mandatory-arbitration agreement requires that 
the employee and employer share the arbitrator’s fee, the employee may be 
unable to afford it and other arbitration costs, as the Supreme Court has re-
cently acknowledged.”); Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2005) (“Others seem to have adopted a strategy 
to raise the cost of proceedings so high that few claimants will dare to go for-
ward.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Reducing the Presumption of Arbitrability, 22 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 460 (2004) (“[W]here they face likely high costs, 
plaintiffs, specifically those with limited means, are unlikely to gamble their 
food or housing money on the chance of a substantial arbitration award.”). 
 12. But see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 
669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (holding that a mandatory employment arbitration 
agreement was adhesive). “It was imposed on employees as a condition of em-
ployment and there was no opportunity to negotiate. . . . [T]he economic pres-
sure exerted by employers . . . may be particularly acute, for the arbitration 
agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few 
employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration require-
ment.” Id. 
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tration, the employer preserved “two bites at the apple” for it-
self when, ostensibly, the intent of the contract was to treat the 
arbitrator’s decision as final and binding. Meanwhile, the em-
ployee was deprived a trial and was stuck with a useless arbi-
tration award. 
No answer is wrong. Rather, the right answer depends on 
your perspective. If you chose the first answer, you would agree 
with many commentators who criticize mandatory employment 
arbitration.13 The second answer represents the consensus of 
many judges,14 while others disagree.15 The third viewpoint is 
widely approved by judges.16 
 
 13. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Normative Considerations of Employment 
Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 393–94 (2006); Mi-
riam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and 
the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. 
REV. 1029, 1078–83 (2004); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Disco-
vering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 521 (2006); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: 
The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1711, 1778–79 (2006). But see, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforc-
ing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class 
Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 252–53 (2006) (arguing that 
enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits society by reducing 
process costs, thereby benefitting consumers, employees, and other adhering 
parties). See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Over-
looked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 
1199 (2000); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitra-
tion of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbi-
tration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the 
Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Margaret M. Harding, The 
Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 857; Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims 
in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77 (1996); Martin H. Malin, 
Privatizing Justice—but by How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589 (2001); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration 
and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
395 (1999); George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ra-
mifications and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (1998); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to 
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of 
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Sternlight, supra note 10, at 
644–74; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual 
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1017 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and 
Coercion under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Julian 
J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (Or Lack Thereof ): Examining the Procedural 
Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 
(11th Cir. 2001); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 
1232–35 (10th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“There is no doubt that parties appearing in federal court 
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I have explored the perspectives underlying answers one,17 
two,18 and three19 in my previous empirical studies of arbitra-
tion. In this Article, I launch a new approach—the moral ha-
zard perspective in answer four—by using data on court review 
of employment arbitration awards. 
 
may be required to assume the cost of filing fees and other administrative ex-
penses, so any reasonable costs of this sort that accompany arbitration are not 
problematic. However, if an employee like Cole is required to pay arbitrators’ 
fees ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day or more in addition to administrative 
and attorney’s fees, is it likely that he will be able to pursue his statutory 
claims? We think not.” (citation omitted)). But see, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (stating a presumptive rule to enforce 
cost-sharing obligations in arbitration agreements that involved poor individ-
uals who are precluded from suing large corporations). The Court stated that 
“[t]o invalidate the agreement on that basis would undermine the ‘liberal fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ It would also conflict with our 
prior holdings that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving 
that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” Id. (citation omitted) 
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983).  
 15. Id. at 26; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 5 (1995) (“[Employers’] concerns have recently increased as a re-
sult of (1) million dollar jury awards to employees and (2) the provision in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 that permits punitive damages in cases of intentional 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act.”). 
 16. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32–33 
(1991) (“Mere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to 
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment 
context.”). Many courts have echoed this view. See Caley v. Gulfstream Aero-
space Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1377 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although there is some 
bargaining disparity here, as often in the employment context, the plaintiffs 
have failed to show that the DRP and its making is so one-sided as to be un-
conscionable.”); Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“There was unquestionably a disparity in bargaining power, as Menards is a 
large national company and Faber did not have the ability to negotiate and 
change particular terms in the form contract. Mere inequality in bargaining 
power does not make the contract automatically unconscionable.”); Cooper v. 
MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2004) (“While the district court’s 
compassion for job applicants is laudable, under its approach practically every 
condition of employment would be an adhesion contract which could not be en-
forced because it would have been presented to the employee by the employer 
in a situation of unequal bargaining power on a take it or leave it basis.”). 
 17. Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employees Are 
Compelled to Waive Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 767–72 (2004). 
 18. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier 
to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Employment Arbi-
tration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143–44. (2002).  
 19. Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Pre-
vail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 573–81 
(2005). 
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Part I of this Article connects the idea of moral hazard to 
employment arbitration, explaining that laws and social pro-
grams reduce personal incentives to avoid risks and arguing 
that judicial review can serve as government insurance by re-
lieving employers of liability for socially undesirable conduct. 
Part II describes how individual employment arbitration 
helps employers manage litigation costs, while simultaneously 
disadvantaging some individuals. 
Part III describes the complex web of standards that courts 
use to review arbitration awards. I also demonstrate that com-
mon law standards for vacatur20 increasingly interfere with ar-
bitration. 
Part IV pinpoints four scenarios that often occur in con-
junction with reversal of arbitrator rulings: courts find that the 
arbitrator’s remedy is unauthorized or excessive; when courts 
vacate awards, delay and litigation expenses grow large; vaca-
tur is sometimes caused by arbitration agreements that embed 
broad, judicial review standards; and state arbitration laws 
tend to increase court interference with awards. 
Part V is the heart of my study, consisting of research 
methods and statistical findings, that identifies a disturbing 
trend regarding court review of arbitration awards: state courts 
vacated many arbitration wins for employees, but not for em-
ployers. 
Part VI states that courts create moral hazard by vacating 
a high percentage of employee wins at arbitration. I also pro-
pose two public policy changes to reduce moral hazard. 
I.  HOW DOES MORAL HAZARD APPLY TO EMPLOYMENT 
ARBITRATION?   
A. WHAT IS MORAL HAZARD? THE INSURANCE ORIGIN OF 
MORAL HAZARD 
Moral hazard is created by risk-sharing contracts or public 
policies that discourage individuals from avoiding costly beha-
viors.21 When the insured has an incentive to act inappropriate-
 
 20. Vacatur means a rule or order by which a proceeding is set aside. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1584 (8th ed. 2004). 
 21. For lawyers, a useful orientation to the subject appears in Tom Bak-
er’s article, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). For 
early studies that develop the moral-hazard idea, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Un-
certainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 
(1963); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and 
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ly by exposing the insurer to the consequences of the insured’s 
loss, moral hazard occurs.22 
Consider the experience of nineteenth-century insurers.23 
They recognized a potential hazard in allowing people to over-
insure for a loss:24 an insured might create a loss and use in-
surance to come out ahead. This result might influence people 
who “were unusually susceptible to the temptation that insur-
ance can create.”25 
Tom Baker’s study of Aetna’s Insurance Guide from the 
1860s concluded that “the insured should never make money by 
a loss. The contract should never be so arranged, that under 
any circumstances it would be profitable to the insured to meet 
with disaster. Any other arrangement is offering a premium for 
carelessness and roguery.”26 
Kenneth Arrow applied the concept of moral hazard to gov-
ernment-sponsored health insurance. Arrow concluded that the 
entitlement might cause individuals to take less responsibility 
for their own care.27 Current studies explore the government’s 
role in causing people to fail to reduce their risk for unhealthy 
behaviors. For instance, a tax code that allows individuals to 
deduct medical expenses encourages less purchasing of private 
health insurance policies. But private insurance reduces un-
healthy behaviors because people pay more as their risks in-
crease.28 State laws that require health insurance to cover al-
 
Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972); John M. Marshall, Moral Hazard, 
66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976); Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Pro-
vision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. 
ECON. 44 (1974); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968); Richard Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A 
Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incen-
tives, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 10 (1970).   
 22. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure 
Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 4, 6 (1983) 
(“[T]he more and better insurance that is provided against some contingency, 
the less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less 
they bear the full consequences of their actions.”); see also Amitai Aviram, The 
Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 54, 94 (2006).   
 23. Baker, supra note 21, at 251.   
 24. Id. at 250. 
 25. Id.   
 26. Id.   
 27. Arrow, supra note 21, at 961–63. 
 28. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and 
Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Pre-
miums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1486–87 (1991).   
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cohol abuse have seen higher rates of consumption compared to 
states that do not insure for this risk.29 Apart from insuring 
personal losses, government programs create moral hazard by 
making individuals pay less for their losses.30 
Other forms of publicly funded insurance create moral ha-
zard. The federal flood insurance program pays property own-
ers for failing to avoid known risks, such as building homes in 
the path of hurricanes.31 Storm insurance creates moral hazard 
when it fails to relocate vulnerable populations to safer areas 
after a devastating event.32 Federal bank deposit insurance has 
a similar effect. It reduces lending costs for banks, thereby 
making credit easier to obtain and enabling banks to make 
riskier loans.33 
B. MORAL HAZARD IN EMPLOYMENT-BASED INSURANCE 
Widespread use of insurance in the employment relation-
ship creates possibilities for moral hazards. Certain pensions, 
called defined benefit plans, promise employees an automatic 
stream of retirement income. To protect retirees from the loss 
of this benefit, Congress created a pension insurance corpora-
tion.34 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) insures 
against losses by taxing employers.35 Moral hazard occurs when 
companies continue to make future pension obligations while 
they underfund current contributions.36 
 
 29. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do 
State Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 175, 186–87 (2006). 
 30. See Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 85 
(2001) (postulating that the moral hazard inherent in many forms of insurance 
is mitigated through devices like copayments, deductibles, limits, and insur-
ance ratings, which pass a part of the cost back to the insured, providing a 
partial incentive to minimize risk). 
 31. Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1654 n.160 (2007). 
 32. Id. at 1654. 
 33. Rajeev Dehejia & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Financial Development and 
Pathways of Growth: State Branching and Deposit Insurance Laws in the 
United States, 1900–1940, 50 J.L. & ECON. 239, 243–44 (2007). 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The PBGC was modeled 
after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,950 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). 
 35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 36. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 
1991 WIS. L. REV. 65, 107 (explaining that companies have an incentive to 
spend capital in ways other than funding pension plans). 
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Similarly, workers’ compensation laws insure employees 
for lost income and medical expenses from on-the-job injuries.37 
These laws also create indirect insurance for employers by ex-
tinguishing tort liability for causing an injury.38 Workers’ com-
pensation laws require employers to purchase insurance or self-
insure to pay employee claims.39 Like other insurance systems, 
workers’ compensation may create incentives for individuals to 
avoid the financial consequences of a lost-time injury.40 A 
worker might prolong her leave of absence beyond the endpoint 
of medical necessity because the insurance fund essentially 
pays her to remain idle.41 
Employers also face moral hazard in that they may fail to 
reduce risky behaviors by relying on insurance to pay for 
avoidable accidents. In Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries,42 an 
employer ordered workers to speed production on power saws 
and removed safety guards.43 Later, an employee sawed off two 
fingers.44 When other workers were similarly hurt, the employ-
er callously dismissed their concerns, stating that claimants 
were paid for their loss.45 
C. A THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AWARDS 
The implications of moral hazard studies are significant for 
my empirical investigation of employment arbitration awards. I 
equate employment arbitration agreements to insurance con-
tracts for employers. These contracts manage two general risks 
for employers: the high cost of trials and related litigation46 and 
liability for wrongdoing.47 
 
 37. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 908–09 (5th ed. 2003). 
 38. Id. at 958–59. 
 39. Id. at 909. 
 40. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compen-
sation “Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 684–90 (1998). Examples include 
injured workers who use compensation benefits to prolong their leave, and 
noninjured workers who file fraudulent lost-time claims. Id. 
 41. Id. at 817. 
 42. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).   
 43. Id. at 915.   
 44. Id. at 915–16.   
 45. Id.    
 46. See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 957–60.   
 47. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001). 
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My theory focuses on employer expenses for liability. In the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress authorized courts to order 
make-whole relief and punitive damages for victims of inten-
tional employment discrimination.48 By enacting Title VII, 
lawmakers also forced employers to self-insure for the societal 
harm that results from workplace discrimination.49 The point is 
that employment discrimination laws can be compared to in-
surance. By making employers pay for their discrimination, 
Congress hoped to diminish the spillover costs to the nation’s 
economy when minorities are excluded from the workforce. 
Lawmakers could have appropriated funds to hire govern-
ment lawyers to enforce Title VII. Instead, a provision in the 
law authorizes courts to order employers to pay a prevailing 
plaintiff ’s attorney’s fees.50 This law creates more incentive for 
employers to avoid liability because private attorney’s fees can 
be high.51 As a result, more employers should want to reduce 
risks associated with Title VII liability. 
Let us now consider government regulation of employment 
arbitration. When Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.52 
broadly approved arbitration as a substitute for trials, the Su-
preme Court promised that by “agreeing to arbitrate a statuto-
ry claim, a party [would] not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute. . . .”53 Gilmer states a theory of forum 
substitution. Arbitrators serve as substitute judges. The theory 
 
 48. When Congress increased employer penalties for employment discrim-
ination, lawmakers reasoned: “Monetary damages are also necessary to make 
discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their 
mental and emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity.” Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 206(A), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1) (2000) (“In an action brought by a complaining 
party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a res-
pondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . the complain-
ing party may recover compensatory and punitive damages.” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under this sub-
chapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a rea-
sonable attorney’s fee . . . .”).   
 51. E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 52. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 53. Id. at 26; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 
15(“[Employers’] concerns have recently increased as a result of (1) million dol-
lar jury awards to employees and (2) the provision in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 that permits punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act.”). 
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implies that when arbitrators determine that evidence supports 
a finding of employer liability, they should provide the relief 
that a judge would order. 
Let us now assume that the arbitrator performs this role, 
but the employer refuses to accept the financial consequences of 
its wrongdoing. When a court vacates the arbitrator’s ruling in 
favor of the employee, forum substitution is undermined. 
Therefore, employers use vacatur courts to counteract the 
negative effects of risky behaviors just as home owners and 
beachfront developers use federal disaster insurance. These 
parties seek government intervention to bail them out of the 
consequences of risky behaviors that turn costly. The moral ha-
zard model indicates that vacatur courts act as government in-
surers by relieving employers of liability for socially undesira-
ble conduct. 
I postulate that employers enter into employment arbitra-
tion agreements because they perceive arbitration as a better 
forum. Through arbitration, they can avoid the growing cost of 
court procedures and rulings.54 Also, employers exploit their 
superior knowledge of information about these contracts.55 A 
typical clause states that an arbitrator’s award shall be final 
and binding. I hypothesize that an employee would be more 
likely than an employer to take this language at face value and 
be deterred from challenging an adverse ruling.56 As a more in-
formed party, however, an employer realizes that it has re-
 
 54. See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 957–61 (noting the high recent esti-
mates of litigation costs). 
 55. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the 
Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 223–24 (1998) (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95, 97–110 (1974)) (noting the numerous advantages that repeat players 
have over one-shotters in litigation). My theory is based on the idea that “re-
peat players have strategic superiority in that they can structure a transaction 
to their advantage.” Id. at 233. 
 56. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 
13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 261–62 (2002) (analyzing research that shows a 
high percentage of literate adults who are unable to extract pertinent informa-
tion from form contracts); id. at 266 (“[T]he legal system is engaging in the fic-
tion of a free and informed market, while turning a blind eye to the realities of 
the marketplace and to the fact that consumers cannot understand and do not 
actually assent to the terms of the consumer contracts they sign.”); see also 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1654–55 (2005) (showing that employees find it difficult and ex-
pensive to challenge an arbitration clause in court, and that the extra legal 
hurdle of mandatory arbitration makes it harder for employees to retain an 
attorney). 
LEROY_mlr 3/15/2009 5:49 PM 
2009] EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN ARBITRATIONS 1009 
 
course to challenge an award in court. Furthermore, depending 
on language in the arbitration agreement, an employer can im-
prove its odds of overcoming the presumption of award finali-
ty—and achieve an outcome that allows the employer to avoid 
liability for wrongdoing.57 
These liability avoidance tactics vary. Some contracts pro-
vide for de novo review of an arbitrator’s award.58 These 
agreements are contradictory. They preclude an employee’s 
access to courts and treat arbitrator awards as final and bind-
ing. But they preserve access to courts for the purpose of ap-
pealing an award, and furthermore, they allow judges to con-
duct a de novo review of the arbitrator’s ruling. The result: 
employers have two separate adjudications to avoid liability. 
In another award-avoidance tactic, some employers draft a 
favorable choice-of-law provision.59 Parties can review awards 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)60 or state arbitration 
law equivalents.61 More states are expanding grounds for chal-
lenging an arbitrator’s award.62 By choosing a state law that 
facilitates judicial nullification of awards, employers can im-
prove their odds of avoiding liability.63 
 
 57. See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that parties may contractually modify the standard of re-
view of an arbitration award); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 
287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that contracting parties can opt out of the 
FAA’s default vacatur standards); Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 
592–93 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that parties may structure the standard of re-
view for arbitration awards as they see fit); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 
No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (noting that any 
doubt about the scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor 
of arbitration); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35, 36 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (noting that arbitration agreements may specify the jurisdiction for 
enforcement); Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774–
75 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that there is a circuit split on whether parties can 
contractually expand the judicial standard of review of an arbitration award 
and concluding that they cannot). 
 58. E.g., Harris, 286 F.3d at 794 (concluding that in the Fifth Circuit, a de 
novo standard of review will be applied to questions of law decided by arbitra-
tors).   
 59. E.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 257 F.3d at 294 (involving an arbi-
tration agreement that was to be governed by New York state law). 
 60. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
 61. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 497 (1956); 
see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2006).   
 62. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73–83 (2000); Am. Arbitra-
tion Ass’n, RUAA and UMA Legislation from Coast to Coast, DISP. RESOLU-
TION TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1. 
 63. E.g., Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 493–94 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (involving an employer’s arbitration agreement that incorporated 
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I now connect this theoretical framework to my empirical 
investigation. If courts enforced a very high percentage of 
awards—let us suppose 100%—no moral hazard would be 
created. The employer would bear the consequences of its beha-
vior by paying damages every time for its unlawful behavior. 
Suppose, however, that courts vacated most awards that order 
employers to pay for their liability. The employee would lose 
the benefit of the bargain for final and binding arbitration. Al-
so, because Gilmer requires courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements, the employee would have no recourse in court. The 
employer would avoid liability that was determined by an arbi-
trator. The vacatur court would insure employers from paying 
for their liability. 
How would this situation compare to other models of moral 
hazard? As in the general insurance model, a contract would 
tempt one party (an employer) to avoid the full consequences of 
its actions and to act inappropriately by exposing another party 
(an employee) to the injurious effects of its misconduct.64 
As a result, employers would be less deterred to engage in 
risky behaviors that create liability, compared to the case 
where the employer would be required to pay.65 The arbitration 
agreement would, in effect, create a temptation that “[brings] 
out the bad in otherwise good people.”66 
I note an important caveat. Proof of moral hazard would 
require evidence that an employer’s avoidance of liability in ar-
bitration actually caused this party to fail to take future pre-
cautions to avoid the same risk.67 For example, an employer 
who vacated an award that remedied sexual harassment would 
fail to learn from the experience and continue to tolerate sexual 
harassment in its workplace. My empirical study does not 
measure employer responses to court rulings that vacate pro-
worker awards. 
 
the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act, even though parties were located in 
Louisiana).   
 64. See Stiglitz, supra note 22 (“[T]he more and better insurance that is 
provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to 
avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of 
their actions.”). 
 65. See Aviram, supra note 22 (“[T]hird-party actions that reduce a risk to 
an individual may create an incentive for the individual to take fewer precau-
tions against the same risk . . . .”). 
 66. Baker, supra note 21, at 251.   
 67. See Beal, supra note 30, at 85–86.   
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II.  EMPLOYER MOTIVATION TO USE ARBITRATION: 
MANAGING THE RISK OF LIABILITY OR SEEKING A 
BETTER ADR PROCESS?   
Consider, again, the Aetna insurance model.68 Aetna as-
sumed that allowing people to buy excess insurance would in-
duce people who “were unusually susceptible to the temptation 
that insurance can create” to engage in fraudulent activities for 
profit.69 The Aetna model assumed that some people would suc-
cumb to “carelessness and roguery.”70 Thus, Aetna wrote insur-
ance contracts to make it impossible for anybody to come out 
ahead by claiming a loss. 
By analogy, I theorize that some employers take a rogue’s 
approach to the contractual promise to treat arbitration awards 
as final and binding. They use courts to insure against a loss. 
When courts are too permissive in relieving their fault, rogue 
employers are rewarded for failing to take responsibility for 
their own misconduct. 
Another phenomenon that is important to consider in light 
of this moral hazard problem is the recent explosion of em-
ployment arbitration. I examine why employers prefer arbitra-
tion to courts since there has been no visible evidence of em-
ployee preference for arbitration over courts. There are two 
schools of thought on this subject. 
The “dark side,” as examined in Part II.A, is that employ-
ers prefer arbitration because it manages their risk of liability 
for unlawful conduct. In particular, arbitration creates process 
disadvantages for employees. Therefore, the odds of employer 
liability are lower as compared to the civil court system. Even if 
arbitration produces a good outcome for the individual, judicial 
review of awards creates “two bites at the apple” for the em-
ployer. 
The “bright side,” as examined in Part II.B, looks at how 
inaccessible courts are due to cost, delay, and over-emphasis on 
procedural manoeuvring. Arbitration holds real promise of an 
adjudicatory hearing for ordinary individuals because of its 
lower cost and simplicity. Moreover, studies show that arbitra-
tion is providing positive outcomes for many employees. 
 
 68. Baker, supra note 21, at 250; see supra Part I.A.  
 69. Baker, supra note 21, at 250.   
 70. Id. (citing AETNA GUIDE TO FIRE INSURANCE FOR THE REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF THE ATENA INSURANCE CO. 157 (1867)). 
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A. THE DARK SIDE OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MANAGING 
THE RISK OF LIABILITY BY CREATING PROCESS DISADVANTAGES 
FOR EMPLOYEES 
For more than a century, the doctrine of employment-at-
will defined American employment law, allowing either the 
employer or individual to terminate the work relationship at 
any time, for any reason.71 However, fundamental changes in 
government regulation of employment during the 1960s altered 
this arrangement. Congress passed sweeping employment dis-
crimination laws.72 In the same period, state courts developed 
common law exceptions to employment at will.73 
As the field of employment law expanded, so did employer 
liability. A critical threshold was reached when courts applied 
tort theories and remedies to workplace disputes, including the 
public policy exception to employment-at-will74 and related 
whistleblower protection,75 emotional distress,76 assault and 
 
 71. See H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 
§ 134 (1877) (“With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring 
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly 
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. . . . [I]t is an indefinite 
hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this respect there 
is no distinction between domestic and other servants.”).  
 72. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 
Stat. 214, 255–57 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 206 & 50 U.S.C. 781 
(2000)) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”); S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 1, at 11 (1964), as 
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2365 (“[A] total of 32 [states] now protect 
against discrimination and segregation in public accommodations and facili-
ties.”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393 (“Considerable progress has been made in eliminat-
ing discrimination in many areas because of local initiative . . . .”).   
 73. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) 
(finding covenant of good-faith-dealing exception to employment-at-will); Pe-
termann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959) (finding a public-policy exception to employment-at-will). 
 74. E.g., Harless v. First Nat’l, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W.Va. 1978) (holding 
that the discharge of an employee who tried to convince his employer to comp-
ly with the consumer credit laws violated a clear public policy of protecting 
consumers); O’Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1978) (holding that employer had no at-will right to discharge an x-ray techni-
cian who refused to perform catheterizations because it would have been illeg-
al for this employee to perform the procedure). 
 75. E.g., Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1061 (Cal. 1998). 
 76. E.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir. 
1991) (applying Texas law to an emotional-distress claim); Bustamento v. 
Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532, 538 (La. 1992) (noting that intentional infliction of 
emotional distress can occur in the workplace). 
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battery in severe cases of sexual harassment,77 negligence,78 
and defamation.79 State constitutions compounded this trend 
by creating privacy rights for workers.80 
In the early 1990s, two critical streams in employment law 
were joined. The 1991 Civil Rights Act81 and Americans with 
Disabilities Act in 199282 posed a liability threat to employers. 
Employment discrimination lawsuits in federal courts doubled 
in five years, as filings soared from 8273 in 1990 to 19,059 in 
1995.83 To put this trend in perspective, consider that employ-
ment claims, including those under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, comprised about fifty-two percent of all civil rights 
cases filed in federal courts in 1995.84 
The 1991 amendments expressly allowed discrimination 
victims to recover up to $300,000 in punitive damages.85 This 
supplemented the strong remedial provisions in Title VII.86 Al-
 
 77. E.g., Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997).   
 78. E.g., Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).   
 79. E.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 892 
(Minn. 1986). 
 80. E.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 89 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991) (concluding that the California constitution protects employees’ 
right to privacy).   
 81. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).   
 82. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 83. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DIST. COURT CASES: JUDI-
CIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, CIVIL CASES FILED BY NATURE OF SUIT 2 tbl.4.4 
(2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table404.pdf. 
 84. Id. (citing 36,600 “Civil Rights” cases in federal courts in 1995, of 
which 19,059 were “Employment” cases).     
 85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (2000) (specifying the compensatory 
and punitive damages available under Title VII). 
 86. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001) 
(explaining the expansion of Title VII remedies). When Congress originally 
conceived section 706(g) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it authorized courts to 
enjoin intentional acts of discrimination and order make-whole-type remedies 
(e.g., back pay), similar to those under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 
848–50. Congress broadened judicial power to remedy intentional acts of dis-
crimination in 1972 because courts could not always provide effective relief. 
Id. at 849–50. But some acts of discrimination make reinstatement an un-
workable remedy. Thus, front pay—ongoing financial relief until a plaintiff 
finds equivalent employment at another workplace—is also authorized in sec-
tion 706(g). Id. at 850. When Congress revisited the remedy issue in 1991, it 
“determined that victims of employment discrimination were entitled to addi-
tional remedies.” Id. at 852. Thus, Congress authorized “the recovery of com-
pensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, 
such as front pay.” Id. at 854. The result is that an employer who commits in-
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so, the total cost of remedies in the 1991 law exceeds the facial 
limit of $300,000 for compensatory damages. Pollard v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. demonstrates the point.87 After finding 
that a female worker experienced flagrant discrimination, the 
district court awarded her $107,364 in back pay and benefits, 
$252,997 in attorney’s fees, and $300,000 in compensatory 
damages.88 
The trial court said that it wanted to award more in com-
pensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991—based 
on the fact that Sharon Pollard could not return to her former 
job because of a severe and continuing hostile work environ-
ment—but declined to award future damages because the court 
believed that the law’s cap on “future pecuniary loss” also ap-
plied to front pay.89 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that 
front pay did not count against the $300,000 limit.90 On re-
mand, the trial court awarded Pollard approximately $2.2 mil-
lion in compensatory damages (for back pay, front pay, and in-
fliction of emotional distress) and $2.5 million in punitive 
damages on the emotional distress claim.91 Pollard shows that 
Title VII is costly for employers. 
A second stream in employment law emerged in 1991 with 
the Supreme Court’s strong approval of mandatory arbitration 
for an age discrimination claim in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
 
tentional acts of discrimination may be ordered to pay tort-like damages, and 
in addition, be subject to the equitable remedies of back pay and front pay. 
 87. 532 U.S. 843, 845 (2001). 
 88. Id. As the only female worker in her department, Pollard was shunned 
by male employees who believed that the Bible teaches that women must to-
tally submit to men. In addition, she was constantly subjected to derogatory 
terms regarding women, including “‘bitches,’ ‘cunts,’ ‘heifers,’ and ‘split tails.’” 
Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 938 (6th Cir. 2000), 
rev’d, 532 U.S. 843 (2001). The men also sabotaged Pollard’s work. Id. Pollard 
felt threatened after her tires were slashed and male coworkers provoked con-
frontations with her. Id. at 939–40. Eventually, she went on a disability leave 
that DuPont’s psychologist approved. Id. at 941. When DuPont’s plant man-
agement could not guarantee that she would not be assigned to work with 
these men, she again refused to return, prompting DuPont to fire her. Id. 
 89. Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924 n.19 
(W.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000) limits compen-
satory and punitive damages under Title VII to $300,000 and that the statute 
defines the former element as “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-
pecuniary losses.”). 
 90. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 853–54. 
 91. Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 666 (6th Cir. 
2005), aff’g, 338 F. Supp. 2d 865 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
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Lane Corp.92 Gilmer held that an employee who had been re-
quired by his employer to sign an arbitration agreement was 
precluded from suing in court.93 The ruling gave employers 
hope for curtailing their expanding liability. More recently, the 
Court’s ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams94 expanded 
Gilmer. 
These oddly conjoined streams encouraged employers to 
use arbitration agreements to bypass courts in hopes of lower-
ing the cost of employment disputes.95 In a late-1990s national 
survey, most Fortune 1000 companies reported that they use 
employment arbitration.96 Ninety percent said that they 
adopted an ADR method as a “critical cost technique.”97 Com-
mentators concluded that adoption of arbitration enabled em-
ployers to limit litigation risks and costs.98 The trend is reflect-
ed today in arbitration procedures that allow employers to 
 
 92. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (listing prior cases where the court has enforced 
arbitration agreements).   
 93. See id. at 26–27. This ruling is synonymous with the expression 
“mandatory arbitration.” In mandatory arbitration, one party conditions a con-
tractual benefit or entitlement—for example, employment or use of a credit 
card—on the other party’s agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration in-
stead of going to court. Because the arbitration clause is a nonnegotiable con-
dition for the contractual relationship, it is called mandatory.     
 94. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (ruling that all employment arbitration 
agreements are enforceable under the FAA, with the exception of a small sliv-
er of agreements that cover transportation workers). 
 95. See Ken May, Arbitration: Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Manda-
tory Programs as Risk Management, DAILY LAB. REP. (WASH., D.C.), May 14, 
2001, at A-5 (“The major advantages of mandatory arbitration, Copus ob-
served, are to limit damages and eliminate class actions. The real risk of liti-
gation, he said, is from tort claims in which a single plaintiff can get millions 
of dollars. Arbitration programs should cap damages, he said, adding that he 
suggests capping damages at the limit of a Title VII claim.”). 
 96. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR 
as Alterative to Litigation, Survey Says, DAILY LAB. REP., May 14, 1997, at A-4 
(“The survey found that over the last three years . . . 79 percent [of employers] 
have used arbitration.”).    
 97. Id.    
 98. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Cor-
porate Disputes, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 71 (1999) (“All else being equal, ADR is 
widely considered cheaper and faster . . . .”); Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance 
Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 
(1997) (“For many employers, managing this risk of liability is a vital part of 
their human resources mission and an important part of their general corpo-
rate cost-control program.”); cf. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: 
Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Res-
olution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998) (“[T]he business world has become 
enamored with ADR.”).   
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manage risk by “eliminat[ing] the jury trial, class actions, and 
large attorney’s fees . . . .”99  
Specific cases lend support for the risk-management thesis. 
Arbitration agreements require workers to waive their right to 
sue100 and to replace a court with arbitration.101 Often, workers 
cannot bargain over this forum.102 Companies create their own 
justice rules to shield themselves from stricter enforcement.103 
Prehearing risk-control tactics include limits on discovery,104 
shorter periods to file claims,105 selection of arbitrators without 
employee input,106 and inconvenient venues.107 Some employers 
not only bar access to courts, but they also deter employee 
 
 99. Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. 
L. REV. 861, 862 (2004); see also David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-
Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Prin-
ciples, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 53 (2003) (contending that employers use arbitra-
tion as a risk-management device). 
 100. See, e.g., Baldeo v. Darden Rests., Inc., No. 04-CV-2185(JG), 2005 WL 
44703, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005). 
 101. See, e.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 146 (2d 
Cir. 2004).   
 102. See, e.g., Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
 103. See DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING 
WORKPLACE CONFLICT 103 tbl.3.11 (2003) (reporting that 36.9% of employers 
indentified “avoids legal precedents” and that 59.3% of employers identified 
“has limited discovery” as reasons for using arbitration).   
 104. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 
(1991) (“Although those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal 
courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party ‘trades the procedures and opportuni-
ty of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitra-
tion.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). 
 105. See, e.g., Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 
2005) (ruling that arbitrator had authority to rule on validity of sixty-day fil-
ing requirement); Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 726–27 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that because ERISA provides a four-year statute of limita-
tions for an action to recover benefits under a written contract, the plan ad-
ministrator breached its fiduciary duty by adopting a mandatory arbitration 
clause that set a sixty-day time limit in which to demand arbitration); Louis v. 
Geneva Enter., 128 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that a 
sixty-day filing limit in arbitration agreement drafted by the employer unlaw-
fully conflicted with three-year statute of limitations for Fair Labor Standards 
Act claims). 
 106. See, e.g., Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(“Given the unrestricted control that one party (Hooters) has over the panel, 
the selection of an impartial decision maker would be a surprising result.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Poole v. L.S. Holding, Inc., No. 2001-57, 2001 WL 1223748, at 
*1 (D.V.I. 2001) (rejecting contention by Virgin Islands employee that Massa-
chusetts is a prohibitively expensive venue to arbitrate claim). 
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access to arbitration by requiring employees to pay large forum 
costs associated with the hearing process.108 
Once the arbitrator has been appointed and the hearing 
commences, additional risk management controls may still be 
in place. Some arbitration agreements bar class actions.109 
They may include remedial limits on statutory claims110 and 
strictures against punitive damages in awards.111 
The arbitration agreement may also anticipate a finding 
adverse to the employer. As an additional risk control, the 
agreement may authorize the losing party to appeal the arbi-
trator ruling and seek expanded review of the award.112 Such a 
provision is intended to circumvent highly deferential court re-
 
 108. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (“The default cost-splitting rule in the Circuit City arbitration 
agreement would deter a substantial percentage of potential litigants from 
bringing their claims in the arbitral forum.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646 
(S.D.W. Va. 2001) (“[P]laintiff has entered into a valid contract to arbitrate 
any employment related issue thereby waiving his right to proceed as a part of 
a class action . . . .”). 
 110. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 827 
(S.D. Ohio 1999) (upholding $162,000 limit imposed by arbitration agreement 
although Title VII permits up to $300,000 in punitive damages). 
 111. See, e.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 225 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Agreement provided that the arbitrator could not award pu-
nitive or exemplary damages.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Award of the Arbitrator shall be binding on the parties here-
to, although each party shall retain his right to appeal any questions of law, 
and judgment may be entered thereon in any court having jurisdiction.”); 
Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Either party 
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . to vacate an ar-
bitration award. . . . [T]he standard of review to be applied to the arbitrator’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law will be the same as that applied by an 
appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.”); 
Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[The 
Agreement] contains a generic choice-of-law clause, stating that it ‘shall be go-
verned by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.’”); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 
452245, at *15 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (“[A]rbitrator shall not have the power 
to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or 
corrected by judicial review for any such error.”); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35, 36 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that agreement pro-
vided for judicial review of the arbitration award “as established by law” and 
for the arbitrator’s “clear error of law”); Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 
243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“The arbitrator . . . shall have no 
power, in rendering the award, to alter or depart from any express provision of 
this Agreement or to make a decision which is not supported by law and sub-
stantial evidence.”). 
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view of arbitration awards. In effect, these employers seek a “do 
over” of the arbitration. 
B. THE BRIGHT SIDE OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: A BETTER 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM COMPARED TO COURTS 
Arbitration has advantages in terms of cost, time, 
precedent, and privacy as compared to trials.113 Some employ-
ers use arbitration in a broader context. As corporations, they 
seek to limit liability in all transactions and disputes, including 
those that arise in the employment relationship.114 
Employer preference for arbitration is better understood 
with historical context. For over three hundred years, busi-
nesses have found courts to be unwieldy and expensive forums 
in which to resolve disputes. In response to businesses that 
were dissatisfied with public tribunals, an English statute of 
1697 authorized courts to enforce arbitration awards.115 Econ-
omists in the 1600s favored arbitration because courts wasted 
time and money.116 Under Lord Mansfield’s influence, English 
commercial law deferred to arbitration rulings.117 
 
 113. See ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
600–01 (3d ed. 2002) (concluding that arbitration allows parties to select their 
own decisionmaker, proceed to a hearing relatively quickly, dispense with te-
diously formal rules, and reduce the friction that accompanies trials); Frank 
E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 55 tbl.1 
(1994) (showing likelihood that ADR will overcome impediments to settle-
ment). 
 114. See Sternlight, supra note 10, at 680 (“The profit maximizing company 
will attempt to draft a dispute resolution contract so as to maximize its profits 
and minimize its losses. The company will seek an agreement that will minim-
ize the likelihood of having any claims made against it at all. In addition, 
where claims are to be brought, the company will attempt to minimize both its 
own transaction costs of engaging in dispute resolution and the cost of the ac-
tual payout upon loss of a claim to a consumer.”). 
 115. An Act for Determining Differences by Arbitration, 1697, 9 & 10 Will. 
3, c. 15 (Eng.) (“Now for promoting trade, and rendering the awards of arbitra-
tors the more effectual in all cases, for the final determination of controversies 
referred to them by merchants and traders, or others, concerning matters of 
account or trade, or other matters; be it enacted . . . .”). John Locke’s role in 
formulating the statute is documented in Henry Horwitz & James Oldham, 
John Locke, Lord Mansfield and Arbitration During the Eighteenth Century, 
36 THE HIST. J. 137, 138–39 (1993). 
 116. See, e.g., JOSIAH CHILD, A NEW DISCOURSE OF TRADE 141–44 (4th ed. 
1745). Child’s chapter, “Concerning a Court Merchant,” said that “this King-
dom will at length be blessed with a happy method, for the speedy, easy, and 
cheap deciding of differences between Merchants, Masters of Ships, and sea-
men by some Court or Courts of Merchants . . . .” Id. at 141. He complained 
that conventional litigation in courts of law entailed “tedious attendance and 
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This view was shared by nineteenth-century American 
courts that upheld arbitration agreements. A New York court 
ruled in 1832 that “[a]wards are much favored, and the court 
will intend everything in their favor.”118 In rejecting a chal-
lenge to an award, the court was troubled that a cost-saving 
process could be overturned by a subsequent and expensive tri-
al.119 
Early in the twentieth century, businesses complained that 
courts were costly and inefficient providers of commercial jus-
tice. Thus, in 1925 Congress enacted the United States Arbitra-
tion Act120 (and renamed it the Federal Arbitration Act in 
1947121) to help businesses reduce expense and delay in resolv-
ing their legal disputes.122 Congress learned from businesses 
that too many courts refused to enforce their private arbitra-
tion agreements.123 Thus, a national arbitration law with fed-
eral jurisdiction was proposed.124 
 
vast expenses.” Id. at 142. 
 117. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 104–05 (1936) (“The collabora-
tion of judge and merchant, if it was to exercise its due influence upon the law, 
required adequate channels of communication. In the development of the spe-
cial jury Lord Mansfield found the vital medium. . . . Lord Mansfield converted 
an occasional into a regular institution and trained a corps of jurors as a per-
manent liaison between law and commerce.”).   
 118. Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige 124, 128 n.1 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). 
 119. See id. at 138 (“If every party who arbitrates, in relation to a contested 
claim, to save trouble and expense, is to be subjected to a chancery suit, and to 
several hundred dollars cost, if the arbitrators happen to err upon a doubtful 
question as to the admissibility of a witness, the sooner these domestic tribun-
als of the parties’ own selection are abolished the better. Such a principle is 
wholly inconsistent with common sense, and cannot be the law of a court of 
equity.”). 
 120. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)). 
 121. See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (amending the 
United States Arbitration Act) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)). 
 122. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that the FAA was pro-
posed to help businesses “avoid the delay and expenses of litigation”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (asserting that Congress believed that the simplici-
ty of arbitration would “reduc[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a 
minimum and at the same time safeguard[ ] the rights of the parties”). 
 123. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings on S. 
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th 
Cong. 8 (1924) [hereinafter Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: 
Hearings] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Comm. on Arbitra-
tion, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York). 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (“The purpose of this bill is to make valid 
and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving 
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction o[f ] admiralty, or which may be 
the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.”).   
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Business leaders complained that lawsuits led to “ruinous 
litigation”125 and hurt American consumers because firms had 
to pass along litigation costs in their prices.126 Companies 
avoided these problems when they voluntarily submitted their 
disputes to arbitration.127 Arbitration offered “the best means 
yet devised for an efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive ad-
justment of . . . disputes.”128 
Today, employers voice similar concerns about courts. 
When Congress studied arbitration in 1997, its survey found 
that nearly one in five employers used arbitration.129 Compa-
nies said that arbitration reduced “employment-related litiga-
tion.”130 Also, a case study of mandatory arbitration found that 
a large company and its employees mutually benefited from the 
method.131 Other studies show that arbitration reduced legal 
fees.132 
Besides promoting efficiency and cost savings, employer-
generated arbitration systems produced surprisingly positive 
results for claimants. A comparison of trials in the federal court 
in New York City and nearby arbitrations held by NASD and 
NYSE found that discrimination complainants fared better in 
 
 125. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings, supra note 
123, at 6. 
 126. See id. (“The litigant’s expenses—that is, whatever is necessary to 
cover the annual outlay for litigation or the fear of litigation, consultations 
with lawyers, the possibility of cancellations, and so forth, eventually creeps 
into the selling price as well.”).   
 127. See id. at 31 (statement of Wilson J. Vance, Secretary, New Jersey 
State Chamber of Commerce) (“[T]here are very few cases that have [actually 
come] to trial in the arbitration tribunals, [because] business men have 
adopted the practice of getting together and settling their business differenc-
es.”). 
 128. Id. (statement of Thomas B. Paton, General Counsel, American Bank-
ers Association). 
 129. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD 97-157, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 2 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97157.pdf. 
 130. Id. at 18. 
 131. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 169 (1997) (“Com-
pulsory employment arbitration offers tremendous benefits to both employers 
and employees. It can reduce significantly the costs and time involved in re-
solving disputes. It also provides a forum for adjudicating grievances to em-
ployees currently shut out of the litigation system.”). 
 132. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation 
of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 51 
(Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004) (finding faster case processing in arbitration); Lewis L. 
Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the Model Employment Termination 
Act, 536 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103, 117 (1994) (finding that le-
gal fees in employment arbitrations were low). 
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the arbitrations.133 Other studies found similar win rates for 
individuals in arbitration.134 In sum, these research findings 
provide supporters and critics of mandatory arbitration reason 
to question their original assumptions about this dispute reso-
lution process. 
The explosion of arbitration as a means for resolving em-
ployment disputes may stem from its popularity with employ-
ers seeking a favorable mechanism for conflict resolution or 
from its advantages as a cost-saving device.135 Regardless of the 
rationale for the increase in employment arbitration, however, 
the fact that employment arbitration is so commonly used has 
implications for my theory of moral hazard. 
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS   
A. OVERVIEW 
In this section, I first explain the research methodology for 
collecting data from court opinions that reviewed arbitration 
awards. Second, I support the moral hazard thesis by showing 
that courts that vacate many awards also function like a gov-
ernment insurance agency that relieves a private party of cost-
ly liability.  
 
 133. See Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dis-
pute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their 
Rights?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57–58 (Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004) (finding that em-
ployees prevail 33.6% of the time in court versus 46.2% of the time in arbitra-
tion; that median damages awarded are $95,554 in court versus $100,000 in 
arbitration; and that the average award of attorneys’ fees is $149,756 in court 
versus $36,282 in arbitration). 
 134. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the De-
bate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 559, 564–65 (2001) (“[S]ome evidence suggests that claimants 
win more cases in arbitration then they do in court . . . .”); Elizabeth Hill, Due 
Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under 
the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 777, 808, 810 (2003) (arbitrations under AAA’s rules did not reveal bi-
as against employees); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment 
Discrimination, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 42–43 (Oct.–Dec.1995) (comparing win 
rates and award amounts for litigation and arbitration in the securities indus-
try from 1992 to 1994, employees won 28% of nonjury trials, 38% of jury trials, 
and 48% of arbitrations); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbi-
tration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 46 (1998) (finding 
that employees win 63% of their claims in arbitration and only 14.9% of their 
claims in litigation).  
 135. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings, supra note 
123, at 6. 
LEROY_mlr 3/15/2009 5:49 PM 
1022 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:998 
 
The FAA is supplemented by parallel legislation in nearly 
every state. These laws, which were based on the Uniform Ar-
bitration Act of 1955 (UAA),136 set forth their own reviewing 
standards for state courts.137 State laws usually mirror FAA 
standards while adding one or more grounds for judicial review 
of an award.138 The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), 
published in 2000 and later adopted by twelve states,139 adds 
another layer of court review.140 
Federal courts provide additional reviewing standards 
when they use common law principles to rule on award chal-
lenges. Some principles—for example, that the award shall not 
be made in manifest disregard of the law—are unique common 
law adjuncts to FAA standards.141 
Federal courts also apply an entirely different set of com-
mon law reviewing principles. These are standards that the 
Supreme Court promulgated specifically for voluntary labor ar-
bitration awards. Such arbitrator rulings are unique insofar as 
they resolve union grievances that allege an employer violation 
of a labor agreement. 
Because labor arbitration is often a quid pro quo for a un-
ion’s waiver of a right to strike, Congress provided special 
treatment of these rulings.142 This was accomplished by enact-
ing § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), a 
law that provides federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements (CBAs) and their embedded arbitration 
clauses.143 The privately adopted custom to arbitrate contract 
disputes, backed by the LMRA, allowed labor arbitration to be-
 
 136. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 95 (1956). 
 137. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2006).   
 138. See infra note 167. 
 139. See infra note 169. 
 140. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73–83 (2000). 
 141. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 142. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 
448, 455 (1957) (“Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the 
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.”). Empirical evidence from the 
1950s, when union organizing was at a high level, confirms this observation. 
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS 10 (1953) (reporting that eighty-nine 
percent of 1442 firms covered by a labor agreement had an arbitration provi-
sion in their contract); see also ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 518 (9th ed. 1980) (estimating that arbitration provisions reflect-
ing this bargained exchange appear in about ninety-six percent of all labor 
agreements). 
 143. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 
61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)). 
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come “the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a sys-
tem of private law for all the problems which may arise . . . .”144 
The point is that court review of these challenged awards 
occurs under § 301 of the LMRA, rather than the FAA. Section 
301 does not specify court reviewing standards, but merely 
creates federal jurisdiction to enforce a collective bargaining 
agreement.145 To address this vague jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court articulated standards in the Steelworkers Trilogy, three 
companion decisions that specifically applied to dispute resolu-
tion in union-management relations.146 Despite the unique cha-
racter of Steelworkers Trilogy standards, there are numerous 
court decisions under the FAA in which these labor-
management principles are applied side-by-side with FAA 
grounds. 
While courts are sincere in proclaiming great deference to 
arbitration in hundreds of cases,147 many fail to recognize that 
the FAA’s list of four narrow standards has quietly ballooned 
over the years. Judges are slow to acknowledge that common 
law doctrines further expand their powers. Most recently, they 
have overlooked a new trend in state arbitration law that con-
tinues to expand grounds for courts to review awards. 
Thus, a snowball effect has been created, and the growing 
list of reviewing standards is transforming court review into an 
insurance program that protects arbitration losers—
particularly employers—from costly awards. 
This is ironic. When legislatures and courts apply non-FAA 
standards, they may intend to protect the weaker party in arbi-
tration from procedural abuses that were created by the drafter 
 
 144. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 581 (1960). 
 145. § 301(a), 61 Stat. at § 156. 
 146. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–85; United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566–68 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–98 (1960). 
 147. See, e.g., Durkin v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 986 F. Supp. 1356, 
1358 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that arbitrator’s decisions deserve a maximum 
level of deference). The court in Durkin stated that: the standard of review of 
arbitration awards “is among the narrowest known to law.” It went onto note 
that: INDFNOnce an arbitration award is entered, the finality that courts 
should afford the arbitration process weighs heavily in favor of the award, and 
courts must exercise great caution when asked to set aside an award. Because 
a primary purpose behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and 
delay of court proceedings, it is well settled that judicial review of an arbitra-
tion award is very narrowly limited. Id. (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. 
Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462–63 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
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of arbitration agreements.148 How do employers take advantage 
of a system that is evolving to curb their unilateral control of 
arbitration? The moral hazard theory suggests that employers 
perceive many opportunities to overturn an unacceptable 
award.149 This is because courts and legislatures are regulating 
every aspect of this private dispute resolution process. Thus, 
more courts are vacating awards. As this occurs, government 
plays the unwitting role of insurer against adverse awards. 
“Government” in this context has a complex meaning. It is 
not a single government, but four separate and uncoordinated 
government bodies that regulate arbitration: the 1925 Congress 
who passed the FAA and its four standards, the federal courts 
that have developed their own common law for reviewing 
awards, state legislatures that passed the UAA and RUAA, and 
state courts that have added their own interpretive doctrines 
for various facets of award review. Furthermore, these regula-
tory bodies have never had clear and exclusive boundaries, nor 
has there been any effort to coordinate this layered approach. 
For employers, the disjointed patchwork of regulation presents 
a wide array of reviewing standards that represent a fertile 
field of possibilities to attack, and perhaps escape, an award. 
B. STATUTORY REGULATION: FAA AND STATE LAWS PATTERNED 
ON THE UAA 
The main concern of lawmakers who passed the FAA was 
to end judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.150 Congress 
did not want courts to let parties out of an arbitration agree-
ment and into a lawsuit. Thus, Congress was primarily con-
cerned about court intervention in private disputes before or 
during the arbitration. 
Lawmakers gave only passing thought to arbitration dis-
putes that arise after the ADR process runs its full course and 
results in an award. The FAA’s brief legislative history said: 
 
 148. See generally UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 2–7 
(2000) (noting that the drafters considered fundamental fairness and bargain-
ing powers in deciding whether or not to allow waiving of sections of the UAA). 
 149. See supra note 21 (listing sources for an introduction to the moral ha-
zard theory). 
 150. In the 1924 Senate debate about the FAA, Senator Thomas J. Walsh 
explained: “In short, the bill provides for the abolition of the rule that agree-
ments for arbitration will not be specifically enforced.” 66 CONG. REC. 984 
(1924) (statement of Sen. Walsh). The same point was raised during the House 
debate of the FAA. See 68 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Gra-
ham). 
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“The award may then be entered as a judgment, subject to at-
tack by the other party for fraud and corruption and similar 
undue influence, or for palpable error in form.”151 In 1924, the 
Senate created a more complete report, reasoning that an 
award could be set aside if it was secured by corruption, fraud, 
or undue means; if there was partiality or corruption on the 
part of the arbitrators; in a situation where an arbitrator is 
guilty of misconduct or refused to hear evidence; because of pre-
judicial misbehavior by the parties; or because the arbitrator 
exceeded his or her powers.152 A lawyer’s brief on common law 
vacatur provided the main outline for judicial reviewing stan-
dards in the FAA153 and now appears in § 10 of the act.154 
Contemporary courts believe that these grounds are stri-
kingly narrow.155 The first subsection requires proof of arbitra-
tor fraud or corruption.156 The second is similarly narrow when 
it requires proof of evident partiality by the arbitrator.157 The 
third basis refers to unlikely events during the arbitration pro-
ceedings.158 A hearing must be scheduled, and a party must re-
quest a postponement of the hearing.159 In addition, the arbi-
 
 151. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924). 
 152. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 4 (1924). 
 153. At the joint hearing, Julius Henry Cohen, American Bar Association 
member of the commerce, trade, and commercial law committee and general 
counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, provided a brief that 
was accepted into the record and which stated: 
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitra-
tors unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a mat-
ter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced. This exists only 
when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or when 
the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were 
influenced by other undue means—cases in which enforcement would 
obviously be unjust. There is no authority and no opportunity for the 
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what 
the award should have been. 
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings, supra note 123, at 
33–36 (statement and brief of J.H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State 
Chamber of Commerce). The legislative reports and debates said nothing as to 
whether postaward and state court litigation rules should be preempted by the 
new federal law. 
 154. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
 155. E.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (“Judicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it 
ought not to be called ‘review’ at all.”).   
 156. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). 
 157. Id. § 10(a)(2). 
 158. Id. § 10(a)(3). 
 159. Id. 
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trator must refuse to grant the request for postponement.160 
Assuming that these conditions occur, the party moving to va-
cate an award must prove that the arbitrator was “guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown.”161 Similar to the first two FAA provisions, vaca-
tur depends on arbitrator misconduct.162 The other basis in the 
third vacatur element requires proof that the arbitrator refused 
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or 
that the arbitrator was guilty of other misbehavior that preju-
diced the rights of a party.163 The fourth and final ground ap-
pears to be the broadest since it refers to arbitrator judgment 
and discretion.164 A court may vacate an award where arbitra-
tors exceeded their powers.165 Alternatively, an award may be 
vacated for being so indefinite that it is imperfectly executed.166 
In addition, thirty-five states have adopted the UAA, pro-
posed in 1955 to repeal state laws that obstructed arbitration 
agreements, while fourteen other states have enacted similar 
legislation.167 Many state laws contain the four statutory stan-
dards in § 10 of the FAA and add a fifth basis to vacate an 
award.168 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. § 10(a)(3). 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 10(a)(4). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 2–7 (2000).  
 168. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) also adds a fifth basis for vacating 
an award, which the states inherently adopt when codifying the UAA. Section 
12, “Vacating an Award,” states that “[u]pon application of a party, the court 
shall vacate an award where” the award was a result of corruption, arbitrator 
partiality, where an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, or where an arbi-
trator should have postponed a hearing. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 
(amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 497 (1956). The UAA vacatur standards have been 
adopted by many states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120 (2006) (Vacating 
an Award); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512 (2003) (Opposition to an Award); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-212 (2006) (Vacating an Award); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 7-912 (2004) (Vacating an Award); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12 (2007) (Vacat-
ing an Award); IND. CODE § 34-57-1-17, 2-13 (2008) (Causes which may be 
Shown, Vacating an Award); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (2001) (Vacating an 
Award); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160 (West 2005) (Vacating an Award); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938 (2003) (Vacating an Award); MINN. STAT. 
§ 572-19 (2006) (Vacating an Award); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.405 (2000) (Vacat-
ing an Award); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (2007) (Vacating an Award); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2613 (1995) (Vacating an Award); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
48-130 (1977) (Vacating an Award); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-24 (2004) 
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This fairly uniform approach began to fragment after 2000, 
when a national panel of experts approved the RUAA. In a 
2005 survey of all state laws, the American Arbitration Associ-
ation reported that twelve states adopted the RUAA.169 The re-
vised vacatur standards appear in Section 23.170 
The RUAA drafters identified fourteen issues that required 
updating in contemporary arbitration.171 By regulating arbitra-
tions in more detail, these provisions supply award losers with 
more grounds to challenge any alteration in procedure. Thus, 
these new rules function like an insurance policy for award 
challengers. 
The RUAA and UAA drafters said that courts should en-
sure fairness in arbitration. Thus, the RUAA treats arbitration 
as a consensual process.172 The model law also broke new 
ground by regulating arbitrator neutrality.173 It expanded arbi-
trator powers to order discovery, rule on summary judgment 
motions, conduct prehearing conferences, and manage arbitra-
tion processes.174 A new rule empowered courts to enforce a 
preaward ruling.175 
The RUAA drafters also regulated the remedial boundary 
that overlaps arbitration and courts.176 A new section pre-
scribed arbitrator powers to order attorney’s fees, punitive 
damages, and other exemplary relief.177 The RUAA also al-
 
(Grounds for Vacation of Award); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-213 (2000) (Vaca-
tion of Award); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (2007) (Vacating an Award). 
Alaska retains the UAA structure, but it also adopted the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act (RUAA). See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.43.300-.595 (2006). 
 169. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, supra note 62. The states that adopted the 
RUAA are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Id. 
 170. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73–83 (2000). The revised vaca-
tur standards, appearing in RUAA section 23, added a sixth element and 
made other changes in its incorporation of the four FAA standards and the 
fifth standard in the UAA. Id. 
 171. Id. prefatory note, at 1. 
 172. Id. prefatory note, at 1–2 (“[A]rbitration is a consensual process in 
which autonomy of the parties who enter into arbitration agreements should 
be given primary consideration, so long as their agreements conform to notions 
of fundamental fairness.”). 
 173. Id. § 12 (Disclosure by Arbitrator). 
 174. Id. §§ 15, 17 (Arbitration Process, Witnesses; Subpoenas; Depositions; 
Discovery). 
 175. Id. § 18 (Judicial Enforcement of Preaward Ruling by Arbitrator).   
 176. Id. § 21 (Remedies; Fees and Expenses of Arbitration Proceeding).   
 177. Id. § 21(a)–(b).     
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lowed courts to award attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing 
party.178 
In addition, the revised act reaffirmed the need for arbitral 
finality.179 Its regulations were meant to facilitate “the relative 
speed, lower cost, and greater efficiency of the [arbitration] 
process.”180 In particular, RUAA drafters believed that “in most 
cases parties intend the decisions of arbitrators to be final with 
minimal court involvement unless there is clear unfairness or a 
denial of justice.”181 
The moral hazard thesis raises a question with respect to 
the RUAA: did its drafters appreciate the tendency by sore los-
ers in arbitration to challenge the results of their private adju-
dication? The FAA deters challenges by providing very limited 
judicial review standards. But the RUAA expanded procedural 
regulation of arbitration and also broadened the reviewing role 
of courts. The RUAA, therefore, acts as an implicit insurance 
program for arbitration losers. 
C. COMMON LAW STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING ARBITRATION 
AWARDS 
1. The Steelworkers Trilogy 
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to enable businesses to settle 
their disputes in arbitration rather than in court.182 In 1947, 
Congress enacted another federal law for arbitration clauses in 
collective bargaining agreements, though the statute did not 
provide standards for reviewing arbitration awards.183 The La-
bor Management Relations Act (LMRA) was intended to reduce 
strikes and friction between unions and employers by creating 
federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments.184 Notably, the purposes of the FAA and LMRA are so 
 
 178. Id. § 25 (Judgment on Award; Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Ex-
penses). 
 179. Id. § 25 cmt. n.3 (“Section 25(c) promotes the statutory policy of finali-
ty of arbitration awards by adding a provision for recovery of reasonable at-
torney’s fees and reasonable expenses of litigation to prevailing parties in con-
tested judicial actions to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award.”). 
 180. Id. prefatory note, at 1.   
 181. Id. 
 182. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 
(1991) (explaining the congressional intent in passing the FAA). 
 183. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156 
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)). 
 184. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 
455 (1957).   
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distinct that earlier courts questioned whether labor arbitra-
tion awards were reviewable under an arbitration law that was 
intended for business disputes.185 The Supreme Court ended 
this debate by fashioning federal common law principles to re-
view labor arbitration awards.186 In the Steelworkers Trilogy,187 
the Court outlined award reviewing standards. 
In terms more vague than the § 10 standards in the FAA, 
the Court said that “an arbitrator is confined to interpretation 
and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does 
not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”188 An 
arbitrator “may of course look for guidance from many sources, 
yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement.”189 By using expres-
sions such as “essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment”190 and “own brand of industrial justice,”191 Enterprise 
Wheel left some room for courts to review the merits of an 
award. 
Enterprise Wheel underscored its main theme of deference 
to the arbitrator when it said that mere ambiguity in the arbi-
trator’s opinion accompanying an award is not grounds for re-
fusing to enforce that award.192 Furthermore, an award should 
not be disturbed unless the arbitrator “has abused the trust the 
parties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas 
marked out for his consideration.”193 A court should not vacate 
an award merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator’s con-
struction of the agreement.194 
 
 185. See Donald H. Wollett & Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach 
of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 458 (1955) (“[The] applicability of 
the [FAA] to collective agreements turns upon the construction of the phrase 
‘contracts of employment.’ There is disagreement as to whether a collective 
agreement is a contract of employment. But the weight of authority holds that 
it is, and therefore that the [FAA] is inapplicable to collective bargaining 
agreements.”). 
 186. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 582–85 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564, 566–68 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593, 596–98 (1960). 
 187. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582–85; Am. Mfg. Co., 363 
U.S. at 566–68; Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596–98.  
 188. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. 
 189. Id.   
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 598. 
 193. Id.   
 194. Id. at 599 (“[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargain-
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Other Steelworkers Trilogy decisions emphasized the 
unique institutional features of labor arbitration.195 These 
points are important insofar as they suggest that FAA and 
RUAA courts should not use Steelworkers Trilogy standards to 
review individual employment awards. American Manufactur-
ing noted that the “function of the court is very limited when 
the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract in-
terpretation to the arbitrator” because it is “the arbitrator’s 
judgment . . . that was bargained for.”196 This suggests that the 
Steelworkers Trilogy Court was referring to voluntary arbitra-
tion, where a union and employer agreed to substitute arbitra-
tion in place of strikes, lockouts, and other forms of self-help. 
At the time of the Steelworkers Trilogy, these reviewing prin-
ciples were not intended to apply to mandatory arbitration or in 
any other nonlabor context.197 
The Steelworkers Trilogy has been updated in one essential 
area when an award appears to contradict a public policy.198 In-
tending to limit review of these awards, United Paperworkers 
International Union v. Misco held that awards may be set aside 
only if they “would violate some explicit public policy that is 
well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by refer-
ence to the laws and legal precedents and not from general con-
siderations of supposed public interests.”199 
 
ing agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s construc-
tion which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns 
construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him be-
cause their interpretation of the contract is different from his.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 581–85 (1960). 
 196. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 
(1960) (emphasis added). 
 197. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (“[The arbitrator] is 
not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the 
parties are obliged to accept. . . . He is rather part of a system of self-
government created by and confined to the parties.” (quoting Harry Shulman, 
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016 
(1955))). The Court added that “the labor arbitrator is usually chosen because 
of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and 
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are 
not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.” Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation, 363 U.S. at 582.    
 198. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43–45 
(1987). 
 199. Id. at 43 (citations omitted). More recently, the Court reaffirmed the 
principle that judges must demonstrate restraint in reviewing awards. See E. 
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 61–62 
(2000) (reminding federal judges that “both employer and union have granted 
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As discussed below, surprisingly, FAA and RUAA courts 
use award-review principles from the Steelworkers Trilogy. Re-
gardless of whether such borrowing is legally appropriate, I 
note for purposes of my moral hazard analysis: (1) the Steel-
workers Trilogy award-review standards—while narrow—are 
broader than the extremely specific vacatur provisions in the 
FAA’s § 10; and (2) when courts add Steelworkers Trilogy 
grounds in their review of an arbitrator’s ruling, award losers 
gain an extra layer of insurance on top of § 10. 
2. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
Although United Paperworks International Union v. Mis-
co200 was anchored in a labor arbitration context, some courts 
apply its test when they review individual employment arbitra-
tion awards.201 In addition, some award-reviewing courts apply 
a similar though more narrow concept: manifest disregard of 
the law.202 This common law standard can lead to vacatur.203 
Federal circuit courts are divided in their use of manifest 
disregard.204 Adopting the standard, the Second Circuit ex-
 
to the arbitrator the authority to interpret the meaning of their contract’s lan-
guage, including such words as ‘just cause’” and that the parties “have ‘bar-
gained for’ the ‘arbitrator’s construction’ of their agreement” and therefore 
“courts will set aside the arbitrator’s interpretation of what their agreement 
means only in rare instances” (internal citations omitted)); see also Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001) 
(“[E]stablished law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits of 
the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter 
how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”). In Garvey, the Supreme Court, fru-
strated by the Ninth Circuit’s meddling, called the court’s behavior “nothing 
short of baffling” and admonished the federal judiciary not to overturn “the 
arbitrator’s decision because it disagree[s] with the arbitrator’s factual find-
ings, particularly those with respect to credibility.” Id. at 510. 
 200. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29. 
 201. E.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 824–25 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 202. E.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
 203. E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court vacated the panel’s denial of attorney’s fees because 
the arbitrators “appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal prin-
ciple but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.” Id. at 464 (quoting Di-
Russa, 121 F.3d at 821). 
 204. The standard has been adopted by various circuit courts. See Patten v. 
Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2006); Prestige Ford v. 
Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Buchig-
nani v. Vining-Sparks IBG, No. 98-6692, 2000 WL 263344, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 
2, 2000); Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940–41 (11th Cir. 1992) (per 
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plained in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. that arbitrators can-
not “ignore[] the law or the evidence or both.”205 However, the 
standard does not presume that arbitrators know specific 
laws.206 Taking a different view, the Seventh Circuit cast doubt 
on this standard in Judge Posner’s scholarly opinion.207 
Many state courts also apply the manifest disregard stan-
dard. Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co. explained: “[i]n certain 
circumstances, the governing law may have such widespread 
familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a 
court could assume the arbitrators knew the rule and, notwith-
standing, swept it under the rug.”208 
In sum, judicial review of an employment award under the 
FAA is not limited to federal courts. State courts play a nearly 
co-equal role. Reading only the FAA, one might believe that 
courts review employment arbitration awards under the four 
standards that Congress enumerated in § 10. To the contrary, 
arbitration losers may present up to thirteen separate argu-
ments for vacating awards.209 Common law standards play a 
 
curiam); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th 
Cir. 1991); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978). A Tenth Cir-
cuit district court used the standard in Durkin v. CIGNA Property & Casualty 
Corporation, 986 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 205. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 206. In DiRussa, an age-discrimination complainant was awarded 
$220,000, but his request for attorney’s fees—totaling $249,050.10—was de-
nied. DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 820. In his motion to vacate that part of the award, 
DiRussa argued that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the ADEA’s policy 
for granting attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Id. at 822. The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed, stating that “the remedy for that does not lie with us.” Id. at 
823. The court further noted that “‘knowing’ all of the provisions of a particu-
lar statutory scheme without assistance from the parties is a daunting task, 
even for a skilled lawyer or judge.” Id. 
 207. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th 
Cir. 1994). Judge Posner expressed strong doubts about the manifest-
disregard standard by noting that “[w]e can understand neither the need for 
the formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration (we sus-
pect none—that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for clear er-
ror in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modern law of arbi-
tration.” Id.   
 208. Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 883 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990)).   
 209. Such arguments include: (1) manifest disregard of the law (non-
Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard); (2) exceed powers or imperfectly 
execute award (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006) or state UAA equivalent); (3) partial-
ity (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) or state UAA equivalent); (4) award violated a public 
policy (Steelworkers Trilogy common law); (5) misconduct (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) 
or state UAA equivalent); (6) lacks jurisdiction due to timeliness requirements 
(9 U.S.C. § 12 or state equivalent); (7) arbitrator committed a fact-finding er-
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major role in this process. Some are from the Steelworkers Tri-
logy; others, such as manifest disregard for the law, are unique 
to FAA review. But this odd balkanization is hard to defend. 
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended federal and 
state courts to vary so much in the standards that they apply to 
contested awards. 
IV.  CASE ANALYSIS AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS: 
EXPLAINING THE CONTEXT OF  
THE STATISTICAL FINDINGS   
Part IV features an examination of cases in which courts 
defied the norm of confirming awards. When combined with the 
data in Part V, my discussion of the qualitative problems in 
confirming awards informs the analysis of moral hazard in ar-
bitration. 
A. COURTS ALTER THE ARBITRATOR’S REMEDY 
In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Carson, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals vacated an arbitrator’s award of $915,214 in front pay 
to an employee who was discharged after a supplier brought a 
charge against him.210 The arbitrator found that DaimlerChrys-
ler breached its express agreement to “conduct a ‘fair and tho-
rough investigation’ of a supplier’s allegations” against the em-
ployee before discharging him.211 The arbitrator ordered the 
company to reinstate Mr. Carson pending a thorough and fair 
investigation and to give him back pay from the time of dis-
charge until reinstatement.212 
However, after the company failed to reinstate Mr. Carson 
or to conduct another investigation, the arbitrator awarded the 
employee $450,000 in back pay and $915,214 in front pay, less 
$144,000 in mitigation earnings.213 The award was based on 
 
ror (Steelworkers Trilogy common law); (8) arbitrary and capricious, irrational, 
or gross error (non-Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard); (9) arbitrator 
exceeded authority (Steelworkers Trilogy common law); (10) award procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) or state UAA equiva-
lent); (11) award did not draw its essence from the agreement (Steelworkers 
Trilogy common law); (12) remedy was punitive, excessive, or unauthorized 
(non-Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard); and (13) unconstitutional or 
due process challenge (non-Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard). 
 210. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Carson, No. 237315, 2003 WL 888043, 
at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2003). 
 211. See Id. at *1. 
 212. Id. at *4.   
 213. Id. 
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evidence that Mr. Carson sent out nearly five hundred re-
sumes, attended four job fairs, and had eighty-one interviews 
without finding another permanent job.214 The arbitrator de-
termined that the employee’s work-life expectancy was age six-
ty-seven and set this as the endpoint for front pay.215 
This case is highlighted because the state court appeared 
to usurp the arbitrator’s adjudicatory function. Specifically, the 
court reviewed DaimlerChrysler’s argument that Carson was 
not entitled to relief beyond nominal damages because he was 
an at-will employee.216 The court ruled that Carson’s employ-
ment contract fell “between the extremes of at-will and just-
cause.”217 This was a legal ruling on the merits of the parties’ 
contentions at arbitration, as though the judges were the ap-
pointed arbitrators. 
The court also relitigated another part of the employment 
dispute when the judges modified the remedy. In vacating the 
front-pay award, the court reasoned that the arbitrator had no 
authority to order “damages in lieu of reinstatement.”218 The 
court ignored the fact that the company never complied with 
the original award that ordered reinstatement and a fair inves-
tigation. In sum, Carson shows how a court intervenes piece-
meal to usurp an arbitrator’s authority.219 
B. EXCESSIVE DELAY AND LITIGATION EXPENSE CAUSED BY 
LOWER COURT VACATUR OF AN AWARD 
While vacatur of awards may be justified on rare occasion, 
it can leave the disputants without a ruling. As discussed be-
low, Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc highlights a trend in 
which vacatur prolongs a process that is usually fast and low-
cost.220 In Sawtelle, a fired securities broker alleged that his 
employer maliciously tried to sever his relationship with clients 
by defaming him.221 The arbitration was lengthy and expen-
 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. at *4. 
 217. See id. at *1. 
 218. Id. at *5. 
 219. The Carson opinion conflicts with the idea that a “court cannot inter-
fere with an arbitration proceeding—without abusing its discretion—if a valid 
arbitration agreement exists and the specific dispute falls within the sub-
stance and scope of that agreement.” Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. 
Robinson, 12 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 220. 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
 221. Id. at 267–68.   
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sive.222 Arbitrators awarded Mr. Sawtelle nearly $1.83 million 
in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages.223 
The first state court to rule on Sawatelle’s employer’s chal-
lenge largely confirmed the award.224 But the New York Court 
of Appeals vacated the punitive award and remanded the case 
to the same arbitrators.225 The judges reasoned that “in award-
ing $25 million in punitive damages, the [arbitration] panel 
completely ignored applicable law, an error that provides a 
separate basis for vacating the award.”226 They also believed 
that Sawtelle’s award for punitive damages could not be justi-
fied under the guideposts of BMW of North America v. Gore.227 
Thus, the award manifestly disregarded the law.228 
On remand, the arbitrators “accepted voluminous written 
submissions, held a one-day hearing, and issued a second 
award.”229 Their new award contained only one cosmetic 
change230 and the same punitive damages.231 When the lower 
court reviewed the matter again, it vacated the punitive part a 
second time because of its disproportionate ratio to actual dam-
ages.232 
Concerned that another remand to the same panel would 
not change anything, the lower court ordered a third arbitra-
tion before a new panel.233 This prompted Sawtelle to ask the 
court to order remittitur for the excessive portion of the puni-
tive award and spare him the additional time and expense in 
re-arbitrating his case.234 The court conceded that Mr. Saw-
 
 222. Id. at 268.   
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 269 (noting that the New York State Supreme Court reduced 
compensatory damages to $1.08 million but left punitive damages untouched). 
 225. Id. at 276. 
 226. Id. at 273. 
 227. Id. at 270–72 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996)). 
 228. Id. at 274. 
 229. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2004). 
 230. Id. (noting that the only change that the panel made was to modify its 
finding that the employer “orchestrated a campaign of deception” to the phrase 
that the company “orchestrated and conducted a horrible campaign of decep-
tion, defamation and persecution of Claimant”). 
 231. Id.   
 232. Id. at 859. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id.   
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telle’s “suggestion seems to make sense,”235 and that the “histo-
ry of this arbitration undermines the very purpose of arbitra-
tion . . . to provide a manner of dispute resolution more swift 
and economical than litigation in court.”236 Still, the lower court 
denied the motion because no statute authorized a conditional 
reduction in an award. The court affirmed its earlier order for a 
third round of arbitration before new arbitrators.237 Another 
arbitration odyssey appears in Selby General Hospital v. Kin-
dig,238 a case that began with a contract dispute in February, 
1998 and ended in a July, 2006 decision by an Ohio Court of 
Appeals.239 
C. EXPANDED REVIEW OF AN AWARD 
Expanded review clauses may also lead to award nullifica-
tion. For instance, in Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, an African-
American woman quit her job after her supervisor required her 
to repeat a performance test and threatened to fire her.240 Dur-
ing a stressful disciplinary meeting, Gracie Cook cried, stut-
tered, and rubbed her arm.241 Her doctor believed that she suf-
fered stress-induced mini-strokes.242 After she sued her 
employer, Raytheon, in state court on claims that included 
emotional distress and discrimination, the dispute was submit-
ted to an arbitrator.243 
The arbitrator ruled for the Cooks, granting the former 
employee $200,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and her husband $25,000 in damages for loss of 
consortium.244 Raytheon sued to vacate the award on the 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 860. 
 238. No. 04CA53, 2006 WL 2457436 (Ohio Ct. App. July 17, 2006). 
 239. Id. at *1. 
 240. 254 F.3d 588, 591–92 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 241. Id. at 591.   
 242. Id. 
 243. Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 148 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (N.D. Tex. 
2000), aff ’d, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001). Cook originally filed a complaint in 
Texas state court alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress in con-
nection with the end of her employment. Id. Later, her complaint was 
amended to include a Title VII discrimination claim and a tort claim on behalf 
of her husband for loss of consortium. Id. After the company moved to compel 
arbitration of the claims, the parties submitted their dispute to an arbitrator. 
Id.   
 244. Id. The arbitrator determined that the company knew that Cook had 
previously suffered a stroke when it assigned her back to her former job duties 
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grounds that the parties bargained for expanded review and 
the evidence did not support the arbitrator’s tort finding. Ms. 
Cook disagreed, contending that the expanded review clause 
was “inconsistent with the agreement itself and unconscionable 
in light of the parties’ respective bargaining positions.”245 
The district court vacated the award, and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the vacatur ruling.246 The district court appeared to 
re-arbitrate the dispute when it reasoned that Raytheon’s 
treatment of Ms. Cook was not extreme and outrageous con-
duct.247 Ignoring the finality of the award, the court said that 
“it was not unfair for the arbitration agreement to include a 
standard of review that allowed the district court to assess the 
arbitrator’s legal and factual conclusions.”248 The Fifth Circuit 
continued by evaluating the merits of the arbitration case when 
it reviewed the conduct of Raytheon’s supervisor, finding that it 
was not extreme and outrageous.249 
Another arbitration award was nullified as a result of an 
expanded review clause. A principal of a Christian school sued 
her administrator and school board for Title VII sexual ha-
rassment and whistleblower violations in Prescott v. Northlake 
Christian School.250 A court ordered arbitration after the school 
presented an employment contract that reflected the parties’ 
agreement to use dispute resolution principles and procedures 
from the Institute of Christian Conciliation.251 The contract in-
corporated the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA)252 
and contained the parties’ handwritten amendment providing 
that “[n]o party waives appeal rights, if any, by signing this 
agreement.”253 
 
upon her return. Id. Thus, the arbitrator concluded that the company’s treat-
ment of Cook caused her stress, and that placing her in that situation was “ex-
treme and outrageous.” Id. at 745. 
 245. Hughes Training, Inc., 254 F.3d at 592. 
 246. Id. at 595.   
 247. Id. at 592 (reporting that the district court “determined that Raythe-
on’s decision to immediately continue Cook’s time-sensitive evaluation was not 
extreme and outrageous conduct”). 
 248. Id. at 594. 
 249. Id. at 595 (“Employers cannot be expected to cater to the peculiar sen-
sitivities of an employee who cannot physically work in a stressful environ-
ment.”).  
 250. 369 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 251. Id. at 493. 
 252. Id. The Institute of Christian Conciliation rules and procedures “in-
cluded conducting the arbitration pursuant to” the MUAA. Id. 
 253. Id. at 494. 
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After Ms. Prescott won her arbitration and was awarded 
$157,856.52, the school district returned to federal court to va-
cate the award.254 The district court denied the motion, inter-
preting the handwritten amendment to mean that the parties 
could only appeal under the narrow limits of the Montana arbi-
tration law.255 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and 
construed a disputed contract term as ambiguous.256 
Ignoring the principle of deferring to awards,257 Judge 
Edith Jones reasoned that the “FAA . . . does not bar parties 
from structuring an arbitration by means of their contractual 
agreements, nor does it preempt all state laws regarding arbi-
tration.”258 Writing that “a contractual modification is accepta-
ble,”259 Judge Jones concluded that the “parties intended judi-
cial review to be available beyond the normal narrow range of 
the FAA or MUAA.”260 
A recent Supreme Court decision on expanded review of an 
arbitrator’s award would likely have affected the outcome of 
these cases. In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,261 a com-
mercial landlord required a manufacturer who leased the prop-
erty to indemnify the landowner for any environmental liabili-
ties.262 The parties became embroiled in a dispute over liability 
for pollutants in the well water.263 After litigating the lease’s 
termination clause in federal district court, the parties agreed, 
under the court’s supervision, to arbitrate the indemnification 
clause.264 Notably, the arbitration agreement contained a pro-
vision for expanded judicial review of the award.265 
The Supreme Court recognized that arbitration is meant to 
be flexible—so flexible that parties may “tailor some, even 
many features of arbitration by contract, including the way ar-
bitrators are chosen, what their qualifications should be, which 
 
 254. Id.   
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 497–98.   
 257. Id. at 494–95. 
 258. Id. at 496.   
 259. Id. (quoting Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 
993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 1396 (2008)). 
 260. Id. at 498.   
 261. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). 
 262. Id. at 1400. 
 263. Id. at 1400–01. 
 264. Id. at 1401. 
 265. Id. 
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issues are arbitrable, along with procedure and choice of subs-
tantive law.”266 But the Court ruled that parties cannot agree 
to expand judicial review of awards beyond the statutory stan-
dards in the FAA.267 
This ruling likely means that the employment arbitration 
cases featured in Part V.C and decided in favor of employers 
who drafted expanded review provisions would be treated diffe-
rently today. Courts would not enforce these expanded review 
provisions,268 and consequently, a source for the moral hazard 
problem would be eliminated. However, because less than two 
percent of the arbitration contracts in this study’s database had 
expanded review clauses, much of the moral hazard dilemma is 
unaffected by Hall Street. The larger problem is that courts 
have added common law standards,269 and some states have 
expanded review by adopting the RUAA.270 
D. STATE REGULATION OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 
The FAA does not regulate arbitrator disclosure of conflicts 
of interest,271 but some states do.272 Ovitz v. Schulman,273 an 
important decision by a California appeals court, shows how a 
disclosure law leads to vacatur.274 Ms. Schulman never proved 
 
 266. Id. at 1400–01. 
 267. Id. at 1404 (noting that the text of the FAA “compels a reading of the 
§§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive”). Explaining its ruling, the Court ob-
served that reviewing standards in Section 10 of the FAA deal with extreme 
arbitration misconduct. Thus, the opinion concluded, ‘“Fraud’ and a mistake of 
law are not cut from the same cloth.” Id. at 1405. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See supra notes 182–209 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 169–81 and accompanying text. 
 271. David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interests and Disclosures: Are We 
Making a Mountain out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879, 883 (2008). 
 272. See Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath, 38 
U.S.F. L. REV. 119, 133–36 (2003) (noting that in addition to California, “[a]t 
least two other states, New York and Texas, have begun to draft legislation 
regulating arbitrator disclosure”). 
 273. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).  
 274. Id. at 118 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2, subd. (a)(6)(A)) (not-
ing that the vacatur dispute involved the California Ethics Standards for Neu-
tral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitrations, created in response to a legisla-
tive mandate). The arbitration involved a wrongful termination claim by 
Cathy Schulman, former president of a major film company. Id. at 119. During 
the proceedings, the arbitrator accepted another appointment in a separate 
arbitration involving the same movie company. Id. at 120–21. After the arbi-
trator denied Schulman’s claims and awarded her former employer approx-
imately $1.5 million in damages and $1.9 million in attorney fees and costs, 
Schulman invoked the disclosure law as grounds for vacating the award. Id. at 
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or tried to show arbitrator bias or evident partiality,275 as the 
FAA would require.276 She simply made her vacatur case on the 
arbitrator’s unwitting noncompliance with the state’s disclo-
sure statute, an easier proof.277 Ovitz shows how a court va-
cates an award for a technicality that is unrelated to proof of 
actual injury.278 
Some state laws also regulate the awarding of attorney’s 
fees in arbitration.279 This is relevant because private arbitra-
tion services have rules that authorize this remedy.280 The FAA 
does not preclude this relief.281 Thus, federal courts acting un-
der the FAA confirm awards that order attorney’s fees.282 But, 
Section 21(b) of the RUAA regulates this remedy. It opens the 
door to award challenges, stating that “arbitrator[s] may award 
reasonable attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses of ar-
bitration if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action 
involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to 
the arbitration proceeding.”283 Some state courts vacate awards 
 
121–22. The appellate court found merit in her argument and affirmed the tri-
al court’s denial to reconsider its vacatur. Id. at 129–30.  
 275. Id. at 135. 
 276. Id. at 131. 
 277. Id. at 122. By contrast, the FAA is silent on the subject of arbitrator 
disclosures. Larson, supra note 271. If Schulman had sued under this law, her 
prospects of vacating the award would have been highly doubtful. She would 
have been required to prove that the inadvertent nondisclosure amounted to 
bias or partiality. Ovitz, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118 (citing Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006)). 
 278. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 128. 
 279. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final 
and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
167, 192 (2008). 
 280. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM 
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 2 (2005), http://www.jamsadr.com/ 
images/PDF/Employment_Arbitration_Min_Std.PDF (“All remedies that 
would be available under the applicable law in a court proceeding, including 
attorneys fees and exemplary damages, must remain available in the arbitra-
tion. Post-arbitration remedies, if any, must remain available to an em-
ployee.”). 
 281. Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by 
Statute: Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 551, 592–93 (2008). 
 282. E.g., Pirooz v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:05MC521CDP, 2006 
WL 568571, at *2, *8 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 7, 2006), aff ’d, 237 Fed. App’x 125 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (ordering employer to comply with arbitrator’s award granting 
payment of $106,832.69 in attorney’s fees to the prevailing employee, and in-
creasing the amount due to $120,253.35 to reflect arbitration costs and pre-
judgment interest). 
 283. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 20, 7 U.L.A. 69 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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that order employers to pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing 
employee.284 
In addition, states regulate arbitrator awards of punitive 
damages. Unlike the FAA, the RUAA’s Section 21 allows this 
challenge if the arbitrator’s remedy would not be justified in a 
civil action involving the same claim.285 New York courts used 
this reasoning to vacate the punitive award in Sawtelle.286 In 
contrast, in an FAA decision that left a punitive award undis-
turbed,287 a federal judge reasoned that even if arbitrators ig-
nored some evidence, their error was “not so obvious or egre-
gious as to require overturning the award.”288  
V.  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS  
AND STATISTICAL RESULTS   
A. METHOD FOR CREATING THE SAMPLE 
Drawing from methods derived in my earlier empirical 
studies,289 I used a sample based on Westlaw’s Internet ser-
vice.290 I searched federal and state databases for cases because 
 
 284. Carson v. PaineWebber, Inc., 62 P.3d 996 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) and 
Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho 2005), are two cases that involve 
the RUAA statutes that were used to vacate awards of attorney’s fees. In Cas-
sedy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000), the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s vacatur of 
the arbitrator’s order that the employer pay a fired employee $300,000 in com-
pensatory damages and also $160,000 in lawyer fees.  
 285. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 20, 7 U.L.A. 69 (2000) (“An arbitrator 
may award punitive damages or other exemplary relief if such an award is au-
thorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim and the evidence 
produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal standards other-
wise applicable to the claim.” (emphasis added)). Emphasis is added because 
the law places a condition on this arbitrator power, thus limiting arbitrator 
discretion and creating a new ground for review. 
 286. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858–60 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2004). 
 287. Acciardo v. Millennium Secs. Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422–23 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 288. Id. at 423. 
 289. E.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel 
Turns: New Evidence on the Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 191, 202–03 (2007); see also Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, 
Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace 
Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 45–48 (2001) [herei-
nafter LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice]; Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, 
Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court Review of Punitive Awards in Labor 
and Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 199, 230–34 (2006).  
 290. Datasets, programs, and survey commentary are the results of a sur-
vey independently completed by the author and not by the Minnesota Law Re-
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employers and individuals are allowed a choice of forum to con-
test awards. I also used keywords derived from terms in the 
FAA, RUAA, and state arbitration laws.291 
I limited cases to arbitrations involving an individual and 
employer. Each case involved a post-award dispute in which an 
arbitrator’s ruling was challenged by either an employee or 
employer. I excluded arbitration cases involving unions and 
employers because they involve unique characteristics of labor-
management relations.292 
The sample began with a 1975 decision293 and ended with 
cases from September, 2007. After I identified a potential case, 
I read it to see if it met the inclusion criteria. For example, I 
excluded pre-arbitration disputes over enforcement of an arbi-
tration clause. On the other hand, I included cases where em-
ployees resisted arbitration, were compelled to arbitrate their 
claims, and were later involved in a postaward lawsuit.294 Some 
cases involved employees who preferred court to arbitration but 
prevailed in the private forum, leading the employer to seek 
vacatur.295 
Once a case met the criteria, I checked it against a roster of 
previously coded cases to avoid duplication.296 Next, I took rele-
vant data from each case. Variables included: (1) party who 
won the award; (2) state or federal court; (3) first court ruling 
on motion to confirm or vacate an award; and (4) appellate rul-
 
view. Survey results are on file with the author. 
 291. E.g., “PROCURED BY CORRUPTION,” or “EVIDENT PARTIALITY,” 
or “REFUSING TO POSTPONE THE HEARING,” or “ARBITRATORS EX-
CEEDED THEIR POWERS,” or “IMPERFECTLY EXECUTED.”   
 292. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (“[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining 
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government.”). 
 293. McClure v. Montgomery County Cmty. Action Agency, No. 4798, 1975 
WL 181652 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1975). 
 294. E.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 295. For example, in Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 883 S.W.2d 79, 80–
81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), an employee sued his employer but was ordered by the 
court to arbitrate his claim. After he prevailed in arbitration and was awarded 
$250,000, the employer sued to vacate the award, but the court denied the mo-
tion. Id. 
 296. In rare cases, an award was challenged once and remanded to arbitra-
tion; after arbitrators ruled again, the award was challenged a second time. 
See, e.g., Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2004). Because the awards differed, I treated these award challenges as 
separate cases, even though the parties and dispute remained the same.  
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ing, where appropriate. Companion studies297 analyzed other 
data. 
The data form contained a menu of grounds for a party to 
challenge an award. There were four FAA options, five UAA op-
tions (and a sixth possibility contained in the RUAA), five 
Steelworkers Trilogy standards, and five separate federal com-
mon law standards.298 The list also included a miscellaneous 
category for punitive awards, awards with excessive remedies, 
and awards that violated the Constitution. 
B. METHOD FOR COMPARING REVERSAL RATES BY COURTS 
As this research progressed, a question emerged: what 
should be an inappropriate rate for vacating awards? A bench-
mark was needed to scale whatever vacatur rate is measured. 
Therefore, as the database grew, research began on similar 
studies that provide statistical measures of appellate court af-
firmance or reversal of a lower court or agency ruling. 
Comparative data provide a better assessment of whether 
judicial deference to awards is insufficient, moderate, or exces-
sive. Based on this body of research depicting appellate rever-
sal rates, the study created the following hierarchy of court de-
ference: (A) Extreme Deference299 (affirmance rate of 92.0% or 
 
 297. LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 279, at 186 tbl.1 (finding a spurt of cases 
in the federal district courts since 2000 that review employment arbitration 
awards); LeRoy, supra note 281, at 600 (using an earlier database to conclude 
that states are expanding arbitration reviewing standards, a development that 
is undermining the national policy favoring arbitration). The present study 
adds two innovations. Here, the study analyzes awards by the winning party. 
It computes vacatur rates for awards that were won by employees, and awards 
won by employers. This empirical question is then related to a new theoretical 
question: whether judicial review of employment arbitration creates moral ha-
zard. 
 298. Earlier, I explained the arguments that parties have to challenge em-
ployment awards. See supra Part IV. But here I enumerate more grounds. The 
difference is that some arguments are redundant. For example, “the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority” is an FAA and a Steelworkers Trilogy standard. Thus, 
it is coded in two separate places on the form.   
 299. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in 
the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instru-
ments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 947 (examining appellate court reversal of 
lower courts in the federal system). In employment discrimination cases, ap-
pellate courts reversed less than 6% of wins by employers at trial. Id. at 957. 
This is an extreme example of appellate court deference. A recent study of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provides a second example of extreme judicial 
deference. See Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its 
Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287 (2006). This study showed that as the circuit’s 
caseload mushroomed from 1945 to 2005, appellate courts reversed rulings at 
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more, or reversal rate of 8.0% or less); (B) Great Deference300 
(affirmance rate of 84.0% to 91.9%, or reversal rate of 8.1% to 
16.0%); (C) High Deference301 (affirmance rate of 76.0% to 
83.9%, or reversal rate of 16.1% to 24.0%); (D) Moderate Defe-
rence302 (affirmance rate of 68.0% to 75.9%, or reversal rate of 
24.1% to 32.0%); (E) Slight Deference303 (affirmance rate of 
60.0% to 67.9%, or reversal rate of 32.1% to 40.0%); or (F) No 
Deference304 (reversal rate 40.1% or more). 
C. STATISTICAL FINDINGS AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
The sample had 267 employment arbitration awards that 
were challenged in federal or state courts. Following a court’s 
ruling, 176 cases were appealed. Overall, 443 court decisions 
confirmed or vacated awards, or rendered a split ruling. 
 
a far lower rate. Id. at 289 tbl.1 (finding that the reversal rate was 32.1% in 
1945, 22.5% in 1955, 23.6% in 1965, 21.4% in 1975, 18.2% in 1985, and 9.3% in 
1995; the reversal rate in 2005 dropped to 7.4%). 
 300. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining 
Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 965–66 
(1996) (analyzing 1224 National Labor Relations Board decisions that were 
appealed to federal courts). Courts reviewed NLRB decisions with great defe-
rence in cases where a union violated the National Labor Relations Act, re-
versing in only 14.7% of cases. Id. at 976 tbl.3. 
 301. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An 
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000). Moore 
found that appeals courts affirmed judge and jury factfinding in patent dis-
putes at the same rate: 78%. Id. at 397 tbl.6.   
 302. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy 
and Grievance Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 78 (1991). This research analyzed 1148 federal district court 
decisions and 480 federal circuit court decisions that resulted in a court order 
that compelled or denied arbitration or that enforced or vacated an arbitrator’s 
award in whole or in part. Id. at 98. These decisions were published after June 
23, 1960 and before July 24, 1990. Id. at 98 n.105. A follow-up study compared 
this research with reported data for court review of awards from 1991–2001. 
LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice, supra note 289, at 50 tbl.1. In the first study, 
award confirmation rates by district and appellate courts from 1960–1991 
were, respectively, 71.8% and 70.5%. Id. The more recent study observed very 
similar confirmation rates, with district courts enforcing 70.3% of all chal-
lenged awards, and appellate courts confirming 66.4% of awards. Id.   
 303. For example, LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice, supra note 289, dem-
onstrated slight judicial deference. Federal appeals courts confirmed 66.4% of 
labor awards. Id. at 49.  
 304. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in 
the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of 
the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 506 (2002) (finding 
that the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated twelve of twenty-nine death penal-
ty sentences for a reversal rate of 41.4%). 
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Before proceeding to Table 1, infra, I report on the fre-
quency of employer and employee wins at arbitration. The fol-
lowing percentages are not vacatur or confirmation rates. Ra-
ther, they show how often employees or employers won at 
arbitration. 
At the federal level, district courts ruled on 160 awards 
and appeals courts ruled on eighty-three awards. In the district 
court cases (Table 1), employers had won ninety awards at ar-
bitration (56.3%). Individuals had won fifty-five awards (34.4%) 
and split awards in the remaining fifteen cases (9.3%). In fed-
eral appellate decisions (Table 3), employers had won fifty-six 
awards at arbitration (67.5%). Employees had won twenty 
awards (24.1%) and split awards in seven cases (8.4%). 
At the state level, the sample had 107 rulings from first-
level courts (Table 2)305 and ninety-three rulings from appellate 
courts (Table 4). Employers had won arbitration awards in for-
ty-seven of the cases at the first level, or 43.9% of the chal-
lenged awards in this category. Individuals had won forty-nine 
awards (45.8%) and split awards in the remaining eleven cases 
(10.3%). In state appellate decisions, employers had won forty-
five awards at arbitration (48.4%). Employees had won thirty-
nine awards (41.9%) and had split awards in nine cases (9.7%). 
 
Table 1 
Federal District Court Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins 
 Confirm 
Award 
Partly Confirm 
Award 
Vacate 
Award 
Total 
Employer 
Wins Award 
83 
92.2% 
1 
1.1% 
6 
6.7% 
90 
Split Award 14 
93.3% 
0 
0% 
1 
6.7% 
15 
Employee 
Wins Award 
51 
92.7% 
2 
3.6% 
2 
3.6% 
55 
Total 
χ2 2.063, 
df = .724 
148 
92.5% 
3 
1.9% 
9 
5.6% 
160 
 
 
 
 
 305. States use different names for courts that conduct first review of 
awards (e.g., circuit court, superior court). Here, these tribunals are generical-
ly called “first-level courts”. 
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Table 2 
State First-Level Court Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins 
 Confirm 
Award 
Partly Confirm 
Award 
Vacate 
Award 
Total 
Employer 
Wins Award 
41 
87.2% 
0 
0% 
6 
12.8% 
47 
Split Award 6 
54.5% 
2 
18.2% 
3 
27.3% 
11 
Employee 
Wins Award 
38 
77.6% 
1 
2.0% 
10 
20.4% 
49 
Total 
χ2 13.351, 
df = 4, .010 
85 
79.4% 
3 
2.8% 
19 
17.8% 
107 
 
Table 3 
Federal Appellate Court Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins 
 Confirm 
Award 
Partly Confirm 
Award 
Vacate 
Award 
Total 
Employer 
Wins Award 
48 
85.7% 
0 
0% 
8 
14.3% 
56 
Split Award 5 
71.4% 
0 
0% 
2 
28.6% 
7 
Employee 
Wins Award 
17 
85.0% 
3 
15.0% 
0 
0% 
20 
Total 
χ2 13.831, 
df = 4, .008 
70 
84.3% 
3 
3.6% 
10 
12.0% 
83 
 
Table 4 
State Appellate Court Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins 
 Confirm 
Award 
Partly Confirm 
Award 
Vacate 
Award 
Total 
Employer 
Wins Award 
39 
86.7% 
1 
2.2% 
5 
11.1% 
45 
Split Award 6 
66.7% 
1 
11.1% 
2 
22.2% 
9 
Employee 
Wins Award 
22 
56.4% 
7 
17.9% 
10 
25.6% 
39 
Total 
χ2 10.553, 
df = 4, .032 
67 
72.0% 
9 
9.7% 
17 
18.3% 
93 
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 Finding No. 1: All courts consistently confirmed awards 
at extremely high levels when employers won the arbitration. 
Federal district and appellate courts confirmed, respectively, 
employer-winning awards in 92.2% (Table 1) and 85.7% (Table 
3) of the cases. The difference in these confirmation rates was 
small (6.5 percentage points). State courts behaved similarly, 
confirming employer wins in 87.2% (Table 2) and 86.7% (Table 
4) of first-level and appellate rulings. Comparing state confir-
mation rates, there was virtually no difference between first-
level and appeals courts (0.5 percentage points). 
Finding No. 2: Federal courts ruled similarly on employee 
and employer wins at arbitration. Federal district courts 
treated employee wins at arbitration the same as employer vic-
tories. As shown in Table 1, judges confirmed 92.7% of wins for 
employees and 92.2% of wins for employers. Table 3 illustrates 
that federal appeals courts confirmed 85.7% of employer wins, 
which matched the percentage of pro-employee awards (85.0%). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Federal District 
Court
State First‐
Level Court
Federal 
Appeals Court
State Appeals
Employer Wins Split Award Individual Wins
Chart 1
Court Confirmation of Award by Winning Party
LEROY_mlr 3/15/2009 5:49 PM 
1048 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:998 
 
Finding No. 3: Federal courts were consistent in their ex-
tremely high deference to awards, confirming only slightly 
more awards at the district level. Comparing awards that fa-
vored employers, the overall difference between district and 
appellate court confirmation rates was 6.5 percentage points.306 
In the same comparison for awards that favored employees, the 
difference between district and appellate court confirmation 
rates was 7.7 percentage points.307  
Finding No. 4: State courts overturned more awards than 
federal courts. As shown in Table 2, judges enforced only 77.6% 
of employee wins in state courts where awards were first chal-
lenged. This moderately high confirmation rate was 14.6% less 
than federal district courts (Compare Table 1, Cell for Employ-
er Wins, 92.2%). This difference was statistically significant.308  
Finding No. 5: State courts were inconsistent in reviewing 
awards, as their appellate courts confirmed fewer arbitrator 
rulings than their first-level courts. Comparing awards that 
ruled for employers, state courts ruled the same in first-level 
(87.2%) and appellate cases (86.7%).309 In the same comparison 
for awards that favored employees, the state confirmation rate 
fell 21.2 percentage points—from 77.6% at first-level courts in 
Table 2 to 56.4% for appellate courts in Table 4. 
Finding No. 6: State appellate courts vacated many more 
wins for employees than for employers. Comparing award en-
forcement at the appellate level, Table 4 illustrates that state 
courts confirmed 86.7% of proemployer awards but only 56.4% 
of employee wins at arbitration. This difference was statistical-
ly significant.310  
 
 306. Compare supra tbl.1 (showing that federal district courts confirmed 
92.2% of employer wins), with supra tbl.3 (demonstrating that federal appel-
late courts confirmed 85.7% of employer wins). 
 307. Compare supra tbl.1 (illustrating that federal district courts confirmed 
92.7% of employee wins), with supra tbl.3 (showing that federal appellate 
courts confirmed 85.0% of employee wins). 
 308. See supra tbl.2 (chi-squared = 13.351 with 4 degrees of freedom, im-
plying that the difference in rates would not likely occur by chance). 
 309. Compare supra tbl.2, with supra tbl.4 (showing that state courts rule 
the same in first-level and appellate cases). 
 310. See supra tbl.4 (implying that the difference in rates would not likely 
occur by chance with a calculated chi-squared value of 10.553 with 4 degrees 
of freedom). 
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Figure 1: 
How Arbitration Insures 
Employers Against Liability 
Pre-Dispute 
Phase: 
Employee pre-
fers recourse in 
court, but ac-
cedes to em-
ployer’s version 
of arbitration 
Employer 
avoids court 
when a judge 
enforces the 
arbitration 
agreement. 
Arbitration 
occurs. Em-
ployer speci-
fies the forum 
and its 
process rules. 
Employer chal-
lenges award.  
Court grants 
employer mo-
tion to vacate 
award. 
Arbitrator rules 
for the em-
ployee, and 
orders a reme-
dy that the em-
ployer refuses 
to accept. 
 
Post-Arbitration 
Phase: 
Employer avoids 
trial, nullifies 
award, and incurs 
no liability for 
wrongdoing.  Em-
ployee is denied 
access to trial, loses 
favorable award in 
court, and has no 
recourse. 
VI.  TWO SOLUTIONS   
A. STATE COURTS CREATE MORAL HAZARD BY VACATING A HIGH 
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEE WINS AT ARBITRATION 
Although the FAA envisioned that courts would rarely va-
cate awards, this Article suggests that state courts interfere 
with arbitration outcomes more often than Congress envi-
sioned. I postulate that these intrusions encourage employers 
to focus on defecting from the promise of offering arbitration as 
a forum substitute. The possibility now exists for employers to 
take fewer precautions against unlawful conduct that risks lia-
bility. My thesis is that vacatur courts function like an insur-
ance agency by relieving at-fault employers of liability. Figure 1 
conceptualizes this form of moral hazard. 
Courts in this study also vacated some awards in favor of 
employers, though this very small percentage seems to be in 
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line with congressional intent that judges defer to arbitra-
tors.311 Still, this result raises the potential for moral hazard 
because employers tend to be “repeat players” in arbitration.312 
In contrast, individuals are one-shot players who have no stra-
tegic incentive to learn from this experience.313 I theorize, as a 
corollary to my main thesis, that even when employers lose an 
award due to vacatur, the experience may teach them how to 
vacate employee wins in the future. Whether employers insert 
a clause for expanded court review of the arbitration, or are 
simply aware of the many grounds to challenge an adverse 
award, they understand arbitration better than employees. 
This reality contrasts with a trend that began to favor em-
ployees in the 1970s. Consider workers who challenge an em-
ployer action—for example, termination—by arbitrating a con-
tract grievance and suing separately under a discrimination 
statute. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme 
Court concluded that an employee’s statutory right to a trial 
under Title VII is not foreclosed by the prior submission of his 
discrimination claim to final and binding arbitration under a 
collective-bargaining agreement.314 This phenomenon is de-
scribed as “two bites at the apple” because a claimant is al-
lowed to bring a similar claim on the same facts in two separate 
forums.315 
The moral hazard depicted in Figure 1 creates the opposite 
dilemma: “no bites at the apple” for some claimants. This out-
come plainly violates Gilmer’s assumption of forum substitu-
tion. How else can one interpret the results for state appellate 
courts, which confirmed only 56.4% of proemployee awards?316 
Is this not evidence of “judicial hostility” to arbitration—the 
very antithesis of congressional intent when the FAA was 
 
 311. See supra tbls.1, 2, 3 & 4 (illustrating that, when an employer won in 
arbitration, federal district courts vacated only 6.7% of the awards, state dis-
trict courts vacated 12.8%, federal appellate courts vacated 14.3%, and state 
appellate courts vacated 11.1%). 
 312. See Bingham, supra note 55. 
 313. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of 
the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 330 (2007) (“It has long been known in the legal litera-
ture that, when one side to a controversy is a repeat player and the other side 
is a ‘one-shot player,’ the law evolves to inefficient rules that favor the repeat 
player.”). 
 314. 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974). 
 315. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 310 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 316. See supra tbl.4. 
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enacted?317 When courts vacate awards so often as to invite 
challenges, the promise of final and binding arbitration erodes. 
Figure 1 conceptualizes this moral hazard problem. Box 1 
diagrams the diversion of the litigation stream following Gil-
mer’s broad approval of mandatory arbitration. But Gilmer 
failed to anticipate so much sore losing by employers, who are 
shown in this study to profit by contesting “final and binding” 
awards. 
Consider the recent experience of DaimlerChrysler em-
ployees in Michigan.318 Consistent with Box 1 of Figure 1, the 
company set up an employee dispute resolution program 
(EDRP).319 As shown in Box 2, the employee submitted the dis-
pute to the company’s arbitration forum.320 The arbitrator ruled 
for the employee as demonstrated by Box 3.321 The award in 
one of the DaimlerChrysler employee cases, DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Carson, ordered $450,000 in back pay and $915,214 in 
front pay,322 but as Box 4 illustrates, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals vacated the front-pay award.323 
I suggest that DaimlerChrysler learned how to use Michi-
gan’s courts to circumvent adverse employment awards—an 
ironic result because the courts rewarded DaimlerChrysler for 
defecting from the arbitration system that the company in-
tended as a binding alternative to a trial. 
Now consider DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Porter, a recent 
Michigan appellate decision that affirmed the trial court’s vaca-
tion of another arbitrator’s award in favor of an employee.324 
Ernest Porter was terminated for falsifying his time records.325 
Mr. Porter was subject to DaimlerChrysler’s EDRP (Box 1).326 
Thus, his claim went to arbitration instead of to court (Box 
 
 317. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“[The FAA’s] purpose was to 
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had 
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and 
to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”).   
 318. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Porter, No. 270112, 2006 WL 
3019682 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Carson, No. 
237315, 2003 WL 888043 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2003). 
 319. Porter, 2006 WL 3019682, at *1. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. 2003 WL 888043, at *1. 
 323. Id. at *5. 
 324. Porter, 2006 WL 3019682, at *2–3. 
 325. Id. at *1. 
 326. Id. 
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2).327 The arbitrator found that the company treated Mr. Porter 
differently from co-workers and had no cause to fire him (Box 
3).328 But the lower court vacated the award, reasoning that the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority by ignoring relevant law, and 
its decision was affirmed on appeal (Box 4).329  
This brief discussion shows that DaimlerChrsyler avoided 
two trials, nullified all or most of two adverse awards, and in-
curred very limited liability for its wrongdoing as found in two 
Gilmer forum substitutes (Box 5). These courts nullified the 
judgments of arbitrators who, as surrogate judges, ordered 
damages for employees. The workers continued to be denied 
access to trials. They were left with no meaningful recourse af-
ter this lengthy process. Their Gilmer forum substitute was an 
empty promise. 
Federal courts are not part of the problem. District and ap-
pellate courts behaved the same. Respectively, they confirmed 
92.5%330 and 84.3%331 of challenged awards, whether individu-
als or employers prevailed in the arbitration. Compared to oth-
er appellate benchmarks that I describe in Part VI.B, federal 
district courts used “extreme deference,”332 and federal appeals 
courts exercised “great deference.”333 
But state courts violated the FAA’s policy of ensuring final-
ity of awards. In first-round challenges, state judges enforced 
only 77.6% of employee-favorable awards.334 Compared to 
benchmarks of other courts that exercised first-level review of 
adjudicatory rulings, state judges barely fell into the interme-
diate category of “high deference.”335 Far worse, state appellate 
judges were indifferent to the norm of award finality, vacating 
about half (56.4%) of the awards that ruled in favor of em-
ployees.336 Comparative research puts this level in the “no defe-
rence” category.337  
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at *2–3. 
 330. See supra tbl.1. 
 331. See supra tbl.3. 
 332. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra tbl.2. 
 335. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.   
 336. See supra tbl.4. 
 337. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
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B. TOWARD A SOLUTION: POLICIES TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD 
A solution is needed for the growing “moral hazard” prob-
lem of employer avoidance of public and private forums that 
would otherwise hold them liable for wrongful conduct. This 
study shows that arbitration is saddled with ever-expanding 
grounds to overturn an award. Ostensibly, each new ground in-
tends to improve arbitration. But with each safeguard, courts 
weaken the legal backing for promises to arbitrate a dispute. 
The current award-review regime does not serve its in-
tended purposes. My Article concludes with two policy propos-
als that attempt to reduce moral hazard by creating stronger 
barriers to vacating awards. 
1. Return to the Simplicity of the FAA’s Extremely Narrow 
Standards for Vacating Awards.  
My empirical analysis shows that courts apply a hodge-
podge of standards to review awards—including judicial tests 
from the FAA, UAA, RUAA, Steelworkers Trilogy, and common 
law. One possibility is to reenact the FAA with its original § 10 
award review standards—with the new wrinkle of a broad and 
explicit preemption clause that displaces all state arbitration 
reviewing standards. 
The FAA was enacted with no preemption clause. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has remarked that “The Arbitration Act is 
something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdic-
tion. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing 
and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet 
it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdic-
tion . . . .”338 
The findings in this Article cast a troubling light on the 
mysterious relationship between state and federal courts as 
they co-administer the FAA. Congress should adopt a preemp-
tion clause for the FAA’s § 10 reviewing standards and create 
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for award appeals. 
Preemption language from the Employee Retirement and Secu-
rity Act (ERISA) would provide an appropriate model to ensure 
the supremacy of federal vacatur standards.339 
 
 338. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 
n.32 (1983). 
 339. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (providing that the statute shall “su-
persede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan”).  
LEROY_mlr 3/15/2009 5:49 PM 
1054 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:998 
 
The data suggest that this approach would reduce the 
moral hazard problem by eliminating the growing underbrush 
of state regulation of arbitration. The findings in this study 
show that when federal courts review awards, vacatur rates in 
district and appellate courts average about ten percent, with 
little difference in outcomes for pro-employee or pro-employer 
awards. Moreover, current pronouncements by the Supreme 
Court—including decisions in the 2008 term—show a marked 
trend toward eclipsing a patchwork of state regulations in 
fields where federal laws have been enacted.340 Indeed, the gist 
of my legislative proposal was supported in the current term, 
when the Court stated in Preston v. Ferrer that “The [FAA], 
which rests on Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause, supplies not simply a procedural framework applicable 
in federal courts; it also calls for the application, in state as 
well as federal courts, of federal substantive law regarding ar-
bitration.”341 
2. Compel Employers to Pay Up Front When They Seek to 
Vacate Awards.  
While arbitration is a substitute for courts, private and 
public tribunals have different powers to execute their judg-
ments. Awards depend on voluntary compliance for their execu-
tion. Otherwise, a winning party must sue on the award to se-
cure a compulsory order. In contrast, a party who prevails in a 
state civil trial may be able to secure immediate relief—prior to 
any appeal taken by the loser—to secure compliance with the 
judgment. In other words, a party who loses at trial may be re-
quired to pay immediately. 
Consider Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.342 After Pennzoil 
reached an agreement to purchase Getty Oil Co., Texaco upset 
the deal by topping Pennzoil’s purchase price.343 Pennzoil sued 
 
 340. See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 996 (2008) 
(“And to interpret the federal law to permit [a special checking system for car-
riers], and similar, state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of 
state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations.”); see also Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (“State tort law that requires a 
manufacturer’s catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model 
the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulato-
ry law to the same effect.”).  
 341. 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008). 
 342. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).   
 343. Id. at 4.     
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in state court, claiming tortious breach of contract.344 A jury 
ruled for Pennzoil, finding actual damages of $7.53 billion and 
punitive damages of $3 billion.345 Under Texas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 346(b), Texaco was required to post a $13 billion 
judgment bond as a condition for appealing the ruling.346 More-
over, under the lien and bond provisions of Texas law, Pennzoil 
had a right to commence enforcement of its judgment on the 
verdict before Texaco resolved its appeals.347 These post-
judgment laws immediately cost Texaco; quickly, its stock fell, 
and the firm had credit and bond-rating problems.348 
Compare Pennzoil to Castleman v. AFC Enterprises, Inc., 
another Texas case.349 After removal to federal court, Castle-
man and the AFC franchisee agreed to submit the fast-food 
worker’s claims to arbitration, and she was awarded 
$1,678,622.40 in damages.350 The employer appealed and lost 
its motion to vacate the award.351 
Nonetheless, the case shows how the vacatur process can 
contribute to moral hazard. AFC Enterprises had a cost-free 
appeal, while Texaco encountered immediate problems due to 
an adverse court judgment. If, as a matter of law, winners and 
losers in arbitration were treated like judgment creditors and 
debtors, arbitration losers would feel an immediate conse-
quence for conduct that created liability. An arbitration-review 
law patterned on Texas’ Rule of Civil Procedure 364(b) would 
immediately cost an award loser for appealing the private or-
der. Vacatur would become a costly bet by the award loser. In 
the AFC Enterprises example, the employer would recoup its 
bond only if its appeal had merit. 
The point is that an award with up-front costs for making a 
challenge would strengthen award finality. This would address 
the “no bites at the apple” phenomenon. It would also streng-
then forum substitution by treating a loser’s challenge to an 
arbitrator’s award and a loser’s appeal of a court judgment 
identically. The current practice, in contrast, allows employers 
 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 5; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 364(b) (repealed 1986) (current version 
at TEX. R. APP. P. 24).     
 347. Pennzoil Co.,481 U.S. at 4–5.     
 348. Id. at 5.     
 349. 995 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 350. Id. at 651.     
 351. Id. at 651, 654. 
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to make a cost-free appeal. This buys time and either postpones 
or reverses judgment. As a result, award finality erodes. 
  CONCLUSION   
Earlier, I posed a quandary surrounding an employer’s 
successful challenge to an award that was ostensibly meant to 
be final and binding. Because the employer had also inserted a 
clause for expanded review of the award, the employer took a 
second bite at the apple—and eventually prevailed. The em-
ployee was denied a trial, as well as her victory at an arbitra-
tion that she initially resisted. I suggested that this protracted 
process created moral hazard because the employer used court 
review of an award to avoid the consequences of violating the 
rights of its employee. 
Consider, now, the bigger picture that frames my moral 
hazard thesis. Arbitration offers reduced cost, simplicity, and 
easy accessibility to disputants. But after Gilmer, the process 
was derided because of concerns that employees would not be 
treated fairly. Statistical evidence in this study shows, howev-
er, that employees win all or part of their claims in nearly fifty 
percent of arbitrations. But the benefits of employment arbitra-
tion will not be achieved until the growing vacatur problem—
and its attendant quality of “re-arbitrating” disputes that were 
meant for final and binding resolution—is addressed. As courts 
increasingly vacate awards in employees’ favor, the individual 
must either engage in costly “do over” arbitration or be stuck 
with a useless award because Gilmer bars employees from 
suing. 
This type of court interference is contrary to the intent of 
the FAA. When Congress enacted the FAA, it built a simple 
structure to house arbitration and insulate awards from the 
harsh winds of judicial interference. The “house” was renovated 
in 1955, with adoption of the UAA, and it was remodeled again 
with the RUAA in 2000. On a smaller scale, courts have also 
built upon the modest shelter that Congress created for arbi-
tration awards in 1925. I argue that this simple home is now 
creaking under weighty additions that overburden the core 
FAA structure. Until Congress undertakes a systematic effort 
to fix this leaning structure, by coordinating and simplifying 
award review, the FAA’s “home” for arbitration awards in § 10 
will begin to topple on itself. Meanwhile, courts are creating 
moral hazard by tempting employers to avoid the consequences 
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of their unlawful actions and renege on their contractual prom-
ise to resolve disputes in final and binding arbitration. 
In this Article’s exploration of answer four to the quandary 
I posed in the Introduction, I examined the implications of this 
finding of moral hazard, concluding that the current award 
structure does not serve its goals and that two public policy so-
lutions offer the best chance of remedying a failing arbitral re-
gime. 
